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The Effect of the Adoption of Comparative
Negligence on California Community
Property Law: Has Imputed Negligence
Been Revived?
By WILLIAM A. REPPY, JR.*
Introduction
Some two decades ago, the doctrine of "imputed negligence" be-
tween husband and wife was one of the most scathingly criticized
doctrines of California tort law and community property law.' Under
this doctrine, the negligence of one spouse was imputed to the other, so
that a third-party tortfeasor had a complete defense against the personal
injury action of the spouse if the negligence of the other spouse contrib-
uted to the injury. That is to say, the third-party had such a defense to
the extent that recovery in the suit would be community property, and
* A.B., 1963, J.D., 1966, Stanford University. Visiting Professor of Law, Uni-
versity of California, Berkeley.
1. See, e.g., W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF TORTS 488 (4th ed. 1971);
Brunn, California Personal Injury Damage Awards to Married Persons, 13 U.C.L.A. L.
REV. 587, 588 (1966); Green, The Community Property Defense in Personal Injury
and Death Actions, 33 Tnx. L. REv. 88 (1955) (rule described as "hideous," "incredi-
ble," and lacking "any pretense of justice"); Green, The Texas Death Act, 26 T"x.
L. REV. 461 (1946); James, Imputed Negligence, 14 LA. L. REv. 340 (1954); Keeton,
Imputed Contributory Negligence, 13 TEX. L. REV. 161 (1935); Knutsen, California
Community Property Laws: A Plea for Legislative Study and Reform, 39 S. CAL.
L. REv. 240, 244-47 (1966); Note, Torts: Contributory Negligence of Husband as a
Bar to Recovery by Wife, 24 CALiF. L. REv. 739 (1936); Comment, The Impact of
the Community Property System on Tort Suits, 42 CALm. L. REv. (1954); Note, Stat-
ute of Limitations: Marriage as a Disability: Right of Wife to Sue Alone for Per-
sonal Injuries, 2 CALiF. L REv. 161, 162 (1914) (defense termed "absurd"); Note,
Community Property-Conflicts-Imputed Negligence, 30 S. CAL. L. Rav. 92, 94
(1956).
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California law made almost all parts of a personal injury recovery
community property-whether it was for pain and suffering, lost wages,
or medical expenses.2
In 1957, the state legislature sought to abrogate this defense by
making personal injury damages awarded to a married person his
separate property.' Because of numerous problems generated by this
solution,4 a different approach to avoiding the so-called imputed negli-
gence defense was enacted in 1968. The 1968 amendment, which is
now Civil Code section 5112, reads as follows:
If a married person is injured by the negligent or wrongful act or
omission of a person other than his spouse, the fact that the negli-
gent or wrongful act or omission of the spouse of the injured person
was a concurring cause of the injury is not a defense in any action
brought by the injured person to recover damages for such injury
except in cases where such concurring negligent or wrongful act or
omission would be a defense if the marriage did not exist.5
The statute was enacted in the context of a system in which the negli-
gence of the nonplaintiff spouse could be pleaded by the third-party
tortfeasor as a complete defense to a personal injury action by the
injured spouse. Now the California Supreme Court in Li v. Yellow
Cab6 has abrogated the contributory negligence defense and has adopt-
ed a system of comparative negligence. Language in the Li opinion
suggests that contributory negligence no longer has any function as a
defense and that for the first time the plaintiffs contributory negligence
is relevant in determining the amount of damages recoverable:
The contributory negligence of the person injured in person or
property shall not bar recovery, but the damages awarded shall be
2. See text accompanying notes 11-71 infra. About the only exception to the
all-community recovery rule was damages for harm to property. If the wife owned
the car involved in an accident as her separate property, an award giving her compensa-
tion for repairing it would be separate property on a tracing theory and the husband's
contributory negligence would be irrelevant in such a case.
3. Cal. Stat. 1957, ch. 2334, § 1, at 4066, as amended CAL. CIV. CODE § 5109
(West 1970). See notes 51-54 & accompanying text infra.
4. See text accompanying notes 50-67 infra.
5. Cal. Stat. 1968, ch. 457, § 3, at 1078, as amended CAL. CIv. CODE § 5112
(West 1970) (emphasis added).
6. 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975). Li adopted the
"pure" form of contributory negligence, under which a plaintiff is entitled to some re-
covery even though more than 50% of the negligence is attributed to him. See gen-
erally V. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE (Supp. 1975); Fleming, Comparative
Negligence at Last-By Judicial Choice, 64 CALIF. L. REV. 239 (1976); Schwartz, Li
v. Yellow Cab Company: A Survey of California Practice Under Comparative Negli-
gence, 7 PAC. L. J. 747 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Schwartz Survey]; Comment,
Comparative Negligence in California Multiple Party Litigation, 7 PAC. L. J. 770
(1976) [hereinafter cited as Comparative Negligence].
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diminished in proportion to the amount of negligence attributed to
the person recovering.7
This article will examine the effect of the Li decision on Civil Code
section 5112 and the doctrine by which the negligence of one spouse
was a tort defense in a suit brought by the other. Initially, it is to be
noted that section 5112 is couched in terms of a defense available to
third-party tortfeasors. It is possible, then, to take what I will refer to
in this article as the "narrow interpretation": since section 5112 literally
eliminates only a defense, it does not .bar the reduction of damages re-
coverable by the community to the extent of the percentage of fault
allocable to the nonplaintiff spouse.
Alternatively, section 5112 is susceptible of what I will call the
"broad interpretation": in personal injury litigation, the legislature
intends that in a personal injury action brought by a married person the
negligence of this plaintiff's spouse is irrelevant with respect to the issue
of the damages recoverable. Under the broad interpretation, Li v.
Yellow Cab will have no effect on litigation against married persons.
Such a broad interpretation relieves a marital partnership from a reduc-
tion of damages due to one partner's negligence that business partners
and joint venturers must suffer.
My conclusion is that the narrow interpretation of section 5112 is
appropriate if the California courts will employ along with it a correct
classification of which types of damages are community property and
which ones are the separate property of the injured spouse. This would
require overruling some old, untenable authority which classified dam-
ages awarded for disfigurement, pain, and suffering as community
property. On the other hand, if the California Supreme Court insists on
adhering to the old precedent which classified such damages as commu-
nity property, the broader interpretation of section 5112 is to be pre-
ferred. Although the broad interpretation involves a less than logical
reading of the statute, such an interpretation would be necessary to
counteract the unfairness to the victim spouse that would otherwise flow
from the erroneous characterization of damages for disfigurement, pain,
and suffering as community property.
Looming on the horizon, and threatening to make the thesis of this
article instantly obsolete, is the case of American Motorcycle Associa-
tion v. Superior Court,' in which the court of appeal, on the basis of Li
7. 13 Cal. 3d at 829, 532 P.2d at 1243, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 875.
8. 65 Cal. App. 3d 694, 135 Cal. Rptr. 497 (1977), hearing granted on court's
motion, No. L.A. 30737 (Sup. Ct., Feb. 11, 1977). Because the court has granted
v. Yellow Cab, took the extraordinary step of abrogating the common
law doctrine of joint and several liability, replacing it with a measure of
damages based on the tortfeasor's proportional share of fault. This
decision is contrary to Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Nest-Kart,9 in which a
different panel in the court of appeal found continued vitality in joint
and several liability. The California Supreme Court has granted a
hearing on these two cases. If the supreme court follows Ameri-
can Motorcycles and abrogates the doctrine of joint and several
liability, the reader need not proceed any further, since the third party
tortfeasor will have no need of the imputed negligence doctrine. 10 Under
the American Motorcycles theory of limited several liability, the defend-
ant will be only liable according to the proportion of fault attributable to
him. The plaintiff spouse's award would be reduced by the nonplain-
tiff's negligence (or any other tortfeasor) without resort to the imputed
negligence doctrine. It will be assumed for the purposes of this article
(without proffering an editorial judgment on the matter) that the
California Supreme Court will opt for the Nest-Kart result in favor of
joint and several liability.
Development in California of the All-Community
Characterization Rule and of the So-Called
Imputed Negligence Doctrine in Personal
Injury Cases Involving a
Married Plaintiff
In order to understand the policy questions involved in deciding
what interpretation to give to section 5112, it is essential to examine the
development of California law with respect to both the classification of
personal injury damage awards as separate or community property and
the so-called imputing of the contributory negligence of a plaintiff's
spouse to the plaintiff. The history of these two doctrines is so inter-
twined that a discussion of one necessarily entails a discussion of the
other.
This history begins in 1891 with McFadden v. Santa Ana, Orange
& Tustin Street Railway" Mr. and Mrs. McFadden were driving down
hearing, the vacated opinion of the court of appeal may not, of course, be cited to
the California Supreme Court.
9. Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Nest-Kart, 63 Cal. App. 3d 934, 134 Cal. Rptr. 150
(1976), petition for hearing granted, No. S.F. 23596 (Sup. Ct., Feb. 11, 1977).
10. If the court chooses to abrogate the rule, the problem of classification of dam-
ages as community or separate, will still require resolution. See text accompanying
notes 77-82 infra.
11. 87 Cal. 464, 25 P. 681 (1891).
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the street when their vehicle fell into an excavation dug by the defendant.
Mrs. McFadden was injured. She and her husband sued the defendant
railway as coplaintiffs. 12 At issue was whether the contributory negli-
gence of the husband, who was apparently driving the wagon, barred
recovery by his wife. The trial court had instructed the jury that the
husband's negligence "cannot be imputed to Flora McFadden, and must
not be regarded as her negligence."' 3
The California Supreme Court held that this instruction was erro-
neous when the McFadden case went up on appeal. The court began
its analysis with the classification of the entire recovery of damages for
Mrs. McFadden's injuries as community property:
The right to recover damages for a personal injury as well as the
money recovered as damages, is property, and may be regarded as
a chose in action. . and if this right to damages is acquired by
the wife during marriage, it, like the damages when recovered in
money, is, in this state, community property of the husband and
wife. . . of which the husband has the management, control, and
the absolute power of disposition other than testamentary.' 4
No express discussion of the imputing of negligence was felt to be
necessary by the court; the characterization of damages as community
property made it self-evident that the husband's contributory negligence
was a defense and that the judgment had to be reversed. When we
recall that in 1891 the wife did not even have an ownership interest in
what was called "community" property,' 5 it is hard to quibble with the
recognition of the contributory negligence of the husband as a defense
against an action by the wife once the initial classification of all damages
as community property has been made.
12. At this time, a suit for damages for a wife's personal injuries had to be brought
in the names of both husband and wife. Tell v. Gibson, 66 Cal. 247, 5 P. 223 (1884).
This rule was abrogated by the state legislature in 1913. Cal. Stat. 1913, ch. 130,
§ 1, at 217; see Moody v. Southern Pac. Co., 167 Cal. 786, 791, 141 P. 388, 391
(1914).
13. 87 Cal. at 467, 25 P. at 682.
14. Id. at 467-68, 25 P. at 682 (citations omitted).
15. By 1891, several cases had already decided that the wife had no proprietary
interest in what at that time was therefore erroneously called "community" property;
her only interest was that of expectancy of an heir. See, e.g., Van Maren v. Johnson,
15 Cal. 308, 311 (1860). See also Reppy, Retroactivity of the 1975 California Com-
munity Property Reforms, 48 S. CAL. L. REv. 977, 1055-59 (1975). The fact that
the husband was the sole owner of any recovery in the eyes of the court should be
kept in mind when assessing whether these old decisions are even relevant to the ques-
tion of "imputing" negligence now that section 5105 of the California Civil Code makes
the husband and wife equal owners of community property. CAL. Civ. CODE § 5105
(West Supp. 1977).
In subsequent cases, however, some of which were decided even
before the wife was given an equal ownership share in the community
property, 16 the supreme court did not attribute the defense to the fact
that the negligent husband was the sole owner of the damages awarded.
In Basler v. Sacramento Gas & Electric Co.,"7 decided before the wife
was given equal ownership, the McFadden defense was explained as
follows:
Regardless of the question as to whether or not the wife was so
in the husband's care [as to make him her agent in fact], if his negli-
gence contributed proximately to her injury (since under the laws
of this state the recovery for her injuries is community property,
in which the husband shares and over which he has control), the
law will not permit him to benefit by his own wrong, and therefore
a recovery will not be permitted.' 8
Given the recognition that husband and wife share ownership of com-
munity damages recovered as a marital partnership, it seems misleading
to speak of McFadden rule, as so many cases and commentators do, 19
as "imput[ing] the negligence of the husband to the wife."2  It is
simply inaccurate to describe the McFadden defense as holding "that a
wife was barred from recovery for personal injuries in an action against
a third party where her husband was guilty of contributory negli-
16. The husband and wife were made equal co-owners of all community property
by statute in 1927. Cal. Stat. 1927, ch. 265, § 1, at 484, as amended CAL. CIv. CODE
§ 5105 (West Supp. 1977). The statute was held to apply only to property acquired
after July 29, 1927, the date it became law, and not to any pre-1927 community prop-
erty. Stewart v. Stewart, 204 Cal. 546, 269 P. 439 (1928). Thus, a wife had an owner-
ship interest only in damages arising out of injuries inflicted after July 29, 1927.
17. 158 Cal. 514, Ill P. 530 (1910).
18. Id. at 518, 111 P. at 331-32 (emphasis added). See also Moody v. Southern
Pac. Co., 167 Cal. 786, 790, 141 P. 388, 390-91 (1914) (explaining the McFadden
defense on the ground that since recovery for the wife's injuries would be community
property, contributory negligence would defeat the action). Moody also indirectly rec-
ognized that the husband was still the sole owner of community property at this time,
but the court did not rely expressly on this factor as explaining why the husband's
negligence was a defense.
19. See, e.g., Brunn, California Personal Injury Damage Awards to Married Per-
sons, 13 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 587, 588, 604 (1966); Note, Torts: Contributory Negligence
as a Bar to Recovery by Wife, 24 CALIF. L. REV. 739, 740 (1936); Note, Damages for
Personal Injuries of a Spouse: Now Separate Property, 45 CALIF. L. REV. 779, 780
(1957); Comment, Community Property: The Effect of Personal Injury Agreements
Between Spouses, 6 HASTINGS L.J. 88, 89 (1954); Comment, Civil Code Section 163.5:
Solution or Enigma, 9 HASTINGS L.J. 291 (1958); Comment, Personal Injury Damages
and Inheritance and Gift Taxes: Revenue and Taxation Code § 13560, 24 HASTINGS
L.J. 329, 333 n.33 (1973); Note, Personal Injury Damages and Inheritance and Gift
Taxes-Revenue and Taxation Code Section 13560, 30 S. CAL. L. REV. 92, 94 (1956).
20. Bruton v. Villoria, 138 Cal. App. 2d 642, 292 P.2d 38 (1956). See also
Flores v. Brown, 39 Cal. 2d 622, 630, 248 P.2d 922, 926 (1952).
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gence." It was the classification of the damages as community prop-
erty, not the contributory negligence doctrine, that barred the wife as
such in the McFadden case. Given such classification of the recovery,
the husband's negligence is attributed or imputed to the marital partner-
ship, not to the wife."2
The first major assault on the doctrine came in 1949 in the case of
Zaragosa v. Craven.2 3 Mr. and Mrs. Zaragosa had been injured in the
same accident. Mr. Zaragosa sued the tortfeasor and lost after the
defendant raised a contributory negligence defense. Mrs. Zaragosa then
sued the same defendant, who raised the defense of res judicata. Con-
ceding arguendo that her husband's negligence would bar recovery of
community damages and that such negligence had already been litigated
in the previous action,24 Mrs. Zaragosa contended that a 913 amend-
ment to the Code of Civil Procedure 25 had altered the McFadden court's
classification of a wife's personal injury damages and had made them
separate property. The court held that whatever claims Mrs. Zaragosa
might have had based on the 1913 legislation had been undercut by a
1921 amendment to the same statute.2 6 The court reaffirmed an old
rule:
21. Cooke v. Tsipouroglou, 59 Cal. 2d 660, 664, 381 P.2d 940, 942, 31 Cal. Rptr.
60, 62 (1963). Note that prior to 1927 the contributory negligence of the wife logic-
ally would not bar the husband's recovery of community damages, because he was the
sole owner of such property. See Note, Damages for Personal Injuries of a Spouse:
Now Separate Property, 24 CALIF. L. RFv. 739, 740 (1936). But see Note, Community
Property: Post-Injury Agreement Between Husband and Wife that Tort Cause of
Action and Recovery Shall be Wife's Separate Property: Husband's Contributory
Negligence is Imputable to Wife as to Special Damages Despite Such Agreement, 1
U.C.L.A. L. REv. 377 (1954).
22. Sanderson v. Niemann, 17 Cal. 2d 563, 110 P.2d 1025 (1941); Myers v. Tran-
quility Irr. Dist., 26 Cal. App. 2d 385, 388, 79 P.2d 419 (1938); Martin v. Costa, 140
Cal. App. 494, 35 P.2d 362 (1934); Solko v. Jones, 117 Cal. App. 372, 3 P.2d 1028
(1931); Giorgetti v. Wollaston, 83 Cal. App. 358, 257 P. 109 (1927); Johnson v. Hen-
drick, 45 Cal. App. 317, 187 P. 782 (1919).
23. 33 Cal. 2d 315, 202 P.2d 73 (1949).
24. The wife's contention that the prior adjudication was not binding on her be-
cause she was not in privity with her husband was rejected on the ground that he had
represented her in the first suit. Id. at 318, 202 P.2d at 75.
25. Cal. Stat. 1913, ch. 130, § 1, at 217. The section was amended to read,
in pertinent part: "When a married woman is a party [to an action], her husband
must be joined with her except: 1. When the action concerns her separate property,
including action for injury to her person, libel, slander, false imprisonment, or malicious
prosecution, or her right or claim to the homestead property, she may sue alone ....
(Emphasis added,)
26. Cal. Stat. 1921, ch. 110, § 1, at 102. The amendment eliminated all reference
to separate property, and simply authorized the wife to sue alone on various causes
of action, including personal injuries to her, libel, and slander, and specifically authoriz-
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Money recovered for damages to the wife in this state has always
been held to be community property, because it was not owned by
the wife before marriage, nor acquired afterward by gift, devise,
bequest or descent. 27
Justice Jesse W. Carter, however, in his dissenting opinion in the
Zaragosa case, attacked the basic assumption of the McFadden rule that
all damages for a spouse's personal injuries were properly classified as
community property. In Justice Carter's view, the prior law's classifica-
tion of a married person's damages for disfigurement, pain, and suffer-
ing as community property was erroneous.2" Since the victim owns his
body before marriage, it is separate property; money paid for damages
to the body, by a process of tracing, is therefore also separate. 29
That the majority actually recognized the logic of Justice Carter's
position is perhaps the only reasonable explanation of the next judicial
development with respect to the McFadden defense. In the 1952 case
of Flores v. Brown,30 the California Supreme Court held that dissolution
of the community before the injured spouse recovered damages permit-
ted classification of personal injury damages as separate property. In a
single accident involving a car driven by Mr. Flores, he and his son were
killed and Mrs. Flores was injured.3' The jury was instructed that the
contributory negligence of Mr. Flores would bar any recovery for in-
juries his wife otherwise would have had against the third-party tortfea-
sor.3 2 Even though the jury apparently found Mr. Flores contributorily
ing an action "for the recovery of her earnings," which was certainly community prop-
erty, unless the language was intended to refer only to a wife who was a "sole trader"
under CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §§ 1811-21 (West 1955).
27. 33 Cal. 2d at 319, 202 P.2d at 76.
28. Id. at 323, 202 P.2d at 78. Justice Carter conceded, of course, that damages
for lost earnings by a spouse were properly characterized as community property. Id.
at 323-24, 202 P.2d at 78.
29. Various cases discuss the rule that any property traceable back to a separate
source is also separate, even if received during marriage. See, e.g., In re Marriage
of Mix, 14 Cal. 3d 604, 536 P.2d 479, 122 Cal. Rptr. 79 (1975); Beam v. Bank of
America, 6 Cal. 3d 12, 490 P.2d 257, 98 Cal. Rptr. 137 (1971); Huber v. Huber, 27
Cal. 2d 784, 167 P.2d 708 (1946); Boyd v. Oser, 23 Cal. 2d 613, 620-23 (1944);
In re Marriage of Jafeman, 29 Cal. App. 3d 244, 105 Cal. Rptr. 483 (1972). See
also W. BROCKELBANK, THE COMMUNITY PROPERTY LAW OF IDAHO, 134-38 (1962).
30. 39 Cal. 2d 622, 248 P.2d 922 (1952).
31. Mr. and Mrs. Flores' daughter, Anita, was injured in the same accident, and
a friend of hers was killed. In total, five separate actions were filed against the defend-
ants, who included the driver of the truck with which they collided, and the owner
of the trailer he was hauling. Id. at 625-26, 248 P.2d at 923.
32. This instruction, however, was not given with respect to Mrs. Flores' cause
of action for the wrongful death of her son Felipe, which certainly would have been
a community cause of action had Mr. Flores been alive. See Comment, The Impact
of the Community Property System on Tort Suits, 42 CALIF. L. REv. 486, 490 (1954).
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negligent, they still awarded Mrs. Flores damages for her pain and
suffering, as well as wrongful death damages for the killing of her son.
After the lower court ordered a new trial in all of the actions, in part
because of the inconsistent verdicts, various parties appealed. In dis-
cussing the propriety of imputing the negligence of the deceased hus-
band to the injured wife, the court said:
Mr. Flores's negligence may be imputed to his wife, if at all, only
because the cause of action for the wrongful death of [their child]
was community property.
In the absence of an agreement to the contrary, it is settled
that a cause of action for injuries to either the husband or the wife
arising during the marriage and while they are living together is
community property. . . and the same rule is applicable to a cause
of action for the wrongful death of a minor child. . . . Accord-
ingly, in all of these situations it is ordinarily necessary to impute
the negligence of one spouse to the other to prevent the negligent
spouse from profiting by his own wrong.. . . When the marriage
is dissolved, however, the interests in any of these causes of action
become separate property, and it becomes possible to segregate the
elements of damages that would, except for the community prop-
erty system, be considered personal to each spouse. Under these
circumstances the objective of preventing unjust enrichment may
be accomplished by barring only the interest of the negligent spouse
or his estate.
Mr. Flores died in the same accident in which his wife was in-jured. To allow her to recover for her personal injuries will in no
way enrich Mr. Flores or those who might take through him. Simi-
larly, there will be no unjust enrichment if Mrs. Flores is allowed to
recover for the wrongful death of her son. Damages for wrongful
death are the sum of those suffered by each heir or parent . . .
and accordingly, when the heirs are not husband and wife, the neg-
ligence of one is not imputed to the others because the recovery
may be limited to the nonnegligent heirs. . . . Similarly, in this
case the damages will be limited to those suffered by Mrs. Flores
and the recovery will be hers alone.
: . . When the husband is dead, not only is the reason for the rule
imputing his negligence to his wife gone, but to apply it defeats
its own purpose. It is but a windfall to a defendant who negli-
gently injures a wife or causes the death of a minor child that re-
covery may be barred because the wife's husband was also
negligent. Although allowing the negligent defendant to escape
liability has been considered a lesser evil than allowing the negli-
gent spouse to benefit from his own wrong, surely the former evil
may not be balanced by the latter when the latter is no longer
present.33
33. 39 Cal. 2d at 630-32, 248 P.2d at 926-27. With respect to Mrs. Flores' re-
covery for pain and suffering, the points made are dicta, as she had not appealed the
Exactly what Mrs. Flores is permitted to recover for her personal
injuries is here left unclear, 34 although she could certainly recover for
pain and suffering and for wages that she would have earned after
dissolution of the community had she not been injured. The Flores
opinion leaves other questions unanswered as well, such as whether
reimbursement for Mr. Flores' half interest in community funds that
may have been spent to pay her medical bills are Mrs. Flores' separate
property damages and whether this part of the cause of action survives
to her. If Mr. Flores had not died at once, but had lingered for several
months, what of his half interest in wages that Mrs. Flores might have
earned prior to his death if she had not been injured, and for which
wage loss she is now compensated in damages? Since such earnings
would have been community property, Mr. Flores could have be-
queathed that interest to his legatees to the extent such earnings were
unspent at his death.35 Is that half of the award for lost earnings part of
his surviving wife's damages?36
Assuming that these sums, which the deceased spouse would have
owned and enjoyed if he had lived, are to be included in the surviving
spouse's damages, why would it be a "windfall" to the defendant to
relieve him of liability for such sums, any more than it is a windfall to a
defendant when an employer is denied recovery because his employee,
in the scope of employment, has been contributorily negligent? Surely
on any logical analysis, the evils to which the court refers at the end of
the above quotation can be said to result either from the contributory
negligence defense itself (the evil of allowing the defendant to escape
liability) or from the erroneous classification of the wife's disfigurement,
pain, and suffering damages as community property, with the result
that the injured wife recovers only half of the damages for wrongs done
solely to her while her husband is the beneficiary of a recovery although
he has not been wronged.
Flores was followed by Washington v. Washington,3 7 in which the
grant of a new trial in her suit. The point of departure for the language quoted was
defendants' appeal in the wrongful death action.
34. See generally Comment, The Impact of the Community Property System on
Tort Suits, 42 CALIF. L. REV. 486, 496 (1954).
35. CAL. PROB. CODE § 201 (West 1956).
36. Another open question concerns the operation of the statute of limitations:
When would the Flores majority have determined that Mrs. Flores' cause of action
arose? At the time she was injured, McFadden barred a recovery. The last act giving
her a right to collect damages was her husband's death, which dissolved the community,
leading to the possibility that her cause of action might not be deemed to have arisen
until the death of her husband, which could be years later.
37. 47 Cal. 2d 249, 302 P.2d 569 (1956).
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supreme court held that a divorce decree entered after a husband was
injured but before he recovered damages converted the cause of action
for personal injuries into his separate property. Before considering the
consequences of the divorce, the court attempted to explain why the all-
community-recovery rule was applied when the spouses were married
and cohabiting at the time of the accident and judgment:
A rule permitting apportionment of the damages as suggested,
however, has never been adopted in this state, and in the absence
thereof, treating the entire cause of action as community property
protects the community interest in the elements that clearly should
belong to it. . . . Although such a rule may be justified when it
appears that the marriage will continue, it loses its force when the
marriage is dissolved after the cause of action accrues. In such
a case not only may the personal elements of damages such as past
pain and suffering be reasonably treated as belonging to the injured
party, but the damages for future pain and suffering, future expen-
ses, and future loss of earnings are clearly attributable to him as
a single person following the divorce. Moreover, as in any other
case involving future earnings or other after acquired property, the
wife's right, if any, to future support may be protected by an award
of alimony. Since we have no rule permitting the apportionment
of the elements of a cause of action for personal injuries between
the spouses' separate and community interests and since such a
cause of action is not assignable, it must vest in the injured party
on the dissolution of the marriage.38
Justice Carter concurred, stating that the quoted passage made it clear
that the majority implicitly recognized that the all-community recovery
rule was outmoded, and that the majority would ultimately concede that
damages for disfigurement, pain, and suffering are properly classified as
the separate property of the victim-spouse.39
Justice Carter's suggestion as to the impact of the quoted passage
in Washington, however, did not convince the district court of appeal.
Just thirty days after the decision in Washington was rendered, Nemeth
v. Hair4" was decided. In that case, Mr. and Mrs. Nemeth and their son
were involved in an auto accident. The husband's insurer paid him
pursuant to a policy for most of the damage to the vehicle. The insurer
brought suit in subrogation against the driver of the other car and the
driver's employer, but the employer won a summary judgment on the
ground that the employee was really an independent contractor. Later,
when the wife brought a personal injury action against the driver's
38. Id. at 253-54, 302 P.2d at 571. This reasoning was reaffirmed in In re Mar-
riage of Jones, 13 Cal. 3d 457, 462-64, 531 P.2d 420, 119 Cal. Rptr. 108 (1975).
39. 47 Cal. 2d at 254-57, 302 P.2d at 572-73.
40. 146 Cal. App. 2d 405, 304 P.2d 129 (1956).
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employer, res judicata was pleaded. Relying somewhat reluctantly on
precedents compelling classification of the entire recovery in a personal
injury case as community property,4' the court of appeal followed
Zaragosa and ruled that the judgment against the husband was res judi-
cata as against the wife. Without citing Washington, the court in
Nemeth held that the wife's personal injury damages were community
property.
The primary contention of the plaintiff wife in Nemeth was that the
basis for Zaragosa had been undermined by the enactment in 1951 of a
statute giving the wife management and control of community property
earned by her and "community property money damages received by
her for personal injuries suffered by her." This argument was made in
spite of the language of the statute, which provided that it should "not
be construed as making such money the separate property of the
wife."' 42  Had the husband in this case lost his suit for damages to the
community car because he was found to have been contributorily neg-
ligent in operating the vehicle4' at the time of the accident, the argu-
41. Id. at 408-09, 304 P.2d at 131.
42. Cal. Stat. 1951, ch. 1102, § 1, at 2860 (repealed 1973). The statute provided:
"Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 161a and 172 of this code, and subject to
the provisions of Section 164 and 169 of this code, the wife has the management, control
and disposition, other than testamentary except as otherwise permitted by law, of com-
munity property money earned by her, or community property money damages received
by her for personal injuries suffered by her, until it is commingled with other community
property, except that the husband shall have management, control, and disposition of
such money damages to the extent necessary to pay for expenses incurred by reason
of the wife's personal injuries.
"During such time as the wife may have the management, control and disposition
of such money, as herein provided, she may not make a gift thereof, or dispose of
the same without a valuable consideration, without the written consent of the husband.
"This section shall not be construed as making such money the separate property
of the wife, nor as changing the respective interests of the husband and wife in such
money, as defined in Section 161a of this code."
It should be stressed that nothing in this 1951 statute, which was ultimately repealed
with the adoption of equal management and control in 1975, compelled the classification
of all of the damages awarded in a suit arising out of a wife's personal injuries as
community property. The statute only provided that if any damages were so classified,
such as the wife's lost earnings during the existence of the community, these were to
be in her control.
Why, if not to undercut the imputed negligence rule in the area in which it was
operating unfairly, only damages for personal injuries were placed in the wife's control,
and not damages for invasion of privacy, slander, false imprisonment, or breach of con-
tract, is unclear.
43. Judgment was given to the defendants in the suit on a motion for summary
judgment based on lack of ownership of the vehicle, and the independent contractor
status of the driver. 146 Cal. App. 2d at 406, 304 P.2d at 130.
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ment might not have been completely frivolous, because some of the
early decisions establishing the contributory negligence defense where
the husband had driven the car in which his wife was injured had
stressed his control over community property damages that might be
awarded. 44 The court of appeal, however, held in Nemeth that it was
the husband's coequal ownership of the community property personal
injuries damages, and not exclusive control, that was the foundation for
the Zaragosa defense. 45 Thus, whatever the reason for giving the wife
control of "community property money damages" when she had been
injured, the all-community classification rule was held to be alive and
well as long as the community itself had not been dissolved.
The principle of Flores v. Brown that a dissolution of the commu-
nity eliminated the McFadden defense spawned yet another scheme to
create an exception to the rule. In Kesler v. Pabst,4 after a wife was
injured in an accident in which her husband was contributorily negli-
gent, the spouses entered into a transmutation agreement in which the
husband renounced all interest in any recovery that his wife might
obtain from the third-party tortfeasor. The effect of this agreement on
its face was to transmute the cause of action from community property
to the wife's separate property.17  After a verdict and judgment for the
defendant, plaintiffs appealed, maintaining that the trial court erred in
instructing that any contributory negligence of the husband would bar
the wife's recovery. The court of appeal had accepted the contention
that imputing the husband's negligence was not appropriate where the
husband would, because of such contract, own no share of his wife's
recovery and thus would not profit by his wrong.48 But the supreme
court disagreed. Giving such effect to the postaccident contract be-
tween the spouses did indeed, it held, allow the husband to profit by the
device of voluntarily conferring on his wife as his donee a valuable
property right (to recover damages) that previously did not exist because
of the McFadden defense.49
44. See text accompanying note 14 supra.
45. 146 Cal. App. 2d at 408-09, 304 P.2d at 131.
46. 43 Cal. 2d 254, 273 P.2d 257 (1954).
47. For a discussion of the broad freedom of California spouses to transmute all
kinds of property from community to separate and vice versa, see REPPY & DEFUNIAK,
COMMUNITY PROPERTY IN THE UNrrD STATES 409-15, 421-25 (1975).
48. 262 P.2d 651, 654 (Cal. Ct. App. 1953); see Comment, Community Property:
The Effect of Personal Injury Agreements Between Spouses, 6 HASTNs L.J. 88 (1954)1
Note, 1 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 377 (1954). But see W. BROCKELBANK, THE COMMuNrrY
PROPRTY .ANLW OF IDAHO 214-15 (1962).
49. 43 Cal. 2d at 258, 273 P.2d at 259. The majority in Kesler did recognize,
however, that the cause of action for the wife's pain and suffering and lost wages after
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In 1957 the state legislature finally decided to do something °
about the McFadden defense of imputed negligence. One bill was
submitted that simply prohibited recognition of the contributory negli-
gence of the nonplaintiff spouse as a defense even where recovery would
be community property.51 This proposal was not enacted; rather the
legislature approved a section which provided:
All damages, special and general, awarded a married person in a
civil action for personal injuries, are the separate property of such
married person. 52
Although this section says nothing about imputed negligence, it is
unanimously agreed that the only reason for its enactment was dissatis-
faction with the operation of the imputed negligence defense.53
dissolution differed in some respects from community property. The inconsistency in
the majority's reasoning is exemplified by their statement that the wife's cause of action
would "survive" to her on her husband's death. Had this cause of action been true
community property, the husband would have been entitled to bequeath half of it to
a legatee of his choice. CAL. PROB. CODE § 201 (West 1956). The fact that the
majority chose to graft an alien survival doctrine onto community property jurisprudence
reveals, perhaps, the majority's discomfort with the McFadden rule which improperly
classified pain and suffering as community property.
The Kesler opinion was subsequently followed in Ferguson v. Rogers, 168 Cal.
App. 2d 486, 336 P.2d 234 (1959). However, a sound argument could have been made
that Washington had impliedly overruled it. The Washington rule surely allowed a
contributorily negligent spouse, for example, the husband, to deliberately confer a benefit
on his wife by taking advantage of existing grounds for divorce and suing her to termi-
nate the community, thereby fashioning for her a cause of action in tort free of a
McFadden defense. Would not Washington have also given the wife a cause of action
free of the "imputed" negligence defense had she, pursuant to an implied agreement
with her husband, committed adultery after the accident to give the husband the then-
required "fault" grounds to divorce her? If so, then at least some sort of postaccident
planned activity by the spouses could succeed in eliminating the McFadden defense.
And, of course, under Flores, so would the husband's suicide, committed for the very
purpose of allowing his wife to recover.
50. Prior legislation which had been contended by litigants to affect the issue
is discussed in notes 25, 26 & 42 supra.
51. Brunn, California Personal Injury Damage Awards to Married Persons, 13
U.C.L.A. L. REv. 587, 598 (1966). See also Committee Report: Administration of Jus-
tice: Proposals for Legislation: Personal Injury Action of Spouse; Imputed Negligence,
27 CAL. ST. B.J. 175, 188 (1952).
52. CAL. Cv. CODE § 5109 (West 1970) (formerly § 163.5). The legislature
expressly made application of this section prospective only. Cal. Stat. 1957, ch. 2334,
§ 3, at 4066. It therefore did not apply to existing causes of action or injuries. Fergu-
son v. Rogers, 168 Cal. App. 2d 486, 336 P.2d 234 (1959). The courts strictly confined
the operation of the statute. See, e.g., Estate of Simoni, 220 Cal. App. 2d 339, 33
Cal. Rptr. 845 (1963) (award by Industrial Accident Commission not covered by §
163.5).
53. In re Marriage of Jones, 13 Cal. 3d 457, 531 P.2d 420, 119 Cal. Rptr. 108
(1975); Cooke v. Tsipouroglou, 59 Cal. 2d 660, 381 P.2d 940, 31 Cal. Rptr. 60 (1963);
Charles, Ending the Separate Property Presumption in Auto Accident Cases, 40 CaL.
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It soon became obvious that the 1957 statute was ill-advised. While
it eliminated the McFadden defense, it operated quite unfairly in other
areas due to the improper classification as separate property of such
items of damage as lost earnings during marriage. For example, at the
victim's death, he could will all of such funds away from his surviving
spouse, including half of any damages paid to reimburse the community
for medical expense paid from community savings. Moreover, such
funds were treated for estate and gift tax purposes as belonging solely to
the husband in case of bequest, intestate succession, inter vivos gift, or
commingling with community funds. As a result of the operation of the
1957 statute, the half interest that had been owned under McFadden by
the nonvictim spouse was the separate property of the victim, and taxed
accordingly. 4
After discussing these many faults of the 1957 legislation,5 5 and
recognizing that the only purpose of the 1957 act was to abrogate the
defense of "imputed contributory negligence,"56 a 1967 report of the
California Law Revision Commission recommended
enactment of legislation that would again make personal injury
damages awarded to a married person against a third party com-
munity property. The problem of imputed contributory negligence
should be dealt with in a way less drastic than converting all such
damages into separate property. 57
The latter was to be achieved by enactment of a new statute (now Civil
Code section 511258) that simply abolished the defense.59  However,
ST. B.J. 715 (1965); Friedenthal, Imputed Contributory Negligence: The Anomaly in
California Vehicle Code Section 17150, 17 STAN. L. Rav. 55 (1964); Knutson, Cali-
fornia Community Property Laws: A Plea for Legislative Study and Reform, 39 S.
CA.. L. REv. 240 (1966).
54. See Estate of Rogers, 24 Cal. App. 3d 69, 100 Cal. Rptr. 735 (1972). Com-
mentators widely criticized former section 163.5, for these and several other reasons.
See, e.g., REPPY & DEFUNIAK, COMMUNITY PROPERTY IN THE UNITED STATES 180 (1975);
Knutson, California Community Property Laws: A Plea for Legislative Study and
Reform, 39 S. CAL. L. REV. 240, 246 -n.50 (1966); Comment, Civil Code Section
163.5: Solution or Enigma?, 9 HASTINGS L.J. 291 (1958).
55. 8 CAL. LAW REVISION COMM'N, Damages for Personal Injuries to a Married
Person as Separate or Community Property 1389 (Apr. 8, 1967) [hereinafter cited as
DAMAGES REPORT]. For example, this report criticized the 1957 act for characterizing
as separate property a recovery for medical expenses in cases in which community funds
had been used to pay these expenses prior to the tort judgment. The report was also
critical of the separate property characterization of lost earnings. Id. at 1390. The
report does not, however, criticize the 1957 legislation for classifying as separate prop-
erty damages recovered for pain, suffering, and disfigurement.
56. Id. at 1389-90.
57. Id. at 1391.
58. See text accompanying note 5 supra.
59. DAMAGES REPORT, supra note 55, at 1398.
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the commission did not propose any statute to compel classification of
the damages in most cases as community property;6" apparently this was
left to the court. It is clear, however, that the commission members
expected the courts to return to their pre-1957 classification under the
all-community recovery rule, for the report goes on to recommend a
statute classifying damages as separate property if recovered after di-
vorce or (in some circumstances) after separation.6 In addition, with
respect to damages received during marriage but still on hand at a
subsequent divorce, the commission recommended what was in effect a
reclassification of such funds from community property to separate
property of the victim spouse.6 2
The explanation given in support of these changes is significant.
First, the commission expressed its approval of the declaration in Wash-
ington that funds received as compensation for lost earnings that would
have accrued after dissolution of the community ought logically to be
treated as separate property.6 3 The commission then criticized the all-
separate recovery rule of the 1957 legislation in
cases in which a substantial portion of the damages was accorded
to compensate the victim for lost earnings that would have been
received during the period of the marriage prior to [a] divorce or
separate maintenance action. 64
Finally, it again criticized the all-community recovery classification
insofar as it had authorized shared ownership at dissolution of the
60. One proposal, which was acted on by the legislature, sought to amend the
1957 legislation, specifically former Civil Code section 163.5, to compel classification
of recovery by one spouse in a suit against the other as separate property of the victim.
The supreme court had already relied on this classification under the 1957 act as a
basis for overruling the doctrine of spousal immunity. Self v. Self, 58 Cal. 2d 683,
367 P.2d 65, 26 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1962). The commission obviously did not wish to
undercut the basis for the Self holding.
Additionally, the commission pointed out that "[i]f damages recovered by one
spouse from the other were regarded as community property, the tortfeasor spouse or
his insurer would, in effect, be compensating the wrongdoer to the extent of his interest
in the community property." DAMAGES REPORT, supra note 55, at 1391. This reasoning
seems odd, for the same apology could be made for the so-called imputed contributory
negligence defense sought to be abolished.
61. DAMAGES REPORT, supra note 55, at 1391-93.
62. Id. at 1392-93, 1395. The Commission proposed the awarding of all such dam-
ages (although still labeled community property) at divorce to the victim spouse, just
as separate property of each spouse is confirmed to him or her at divorce, unless such
division would work an injustice. This is essentially the law today. CAL. Crv. CODE
§ 4800(c) (West Supp. 1977). See also In re Marriage of Jones, 13 Cal. 3d 457,
531 P.2d 420, 119 Cal. Rptr. 108 (1975).
63. DAMAGES REPORT, supra note 55, at 1391-92 n.8.
64. Id. at 1392.
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marriage of damages for lost earnings yet to accrue. 5
A close reading of the commission report thus discloses that it
simply cannot be taken seriously when it states at one point that "per-
sonal injury damages awarded to a married person against a third party
should be community property."66 In fact, the brief report noted three
situations in which commissioners believed that at least some elements
of these damages should not be treated as community property.7 Un-
doubtedly other situations could have been noted, and this may explain
why the commission did not recommend substituting a legislatively
compelled all-community classification rule for the 1957 all-separate
recovery mandate.
The recommendations of the commission were enacted into law in
1968,68 and, with minor amendments and recodification, constitute the
statutes the courts must deal with today in handling the imputed contri-
butory negligence problem. These statutes are Civil Code section
5112,69 which provides that the negligence of a spouse is no defense in
an action brought by an injured spouse; section 5109, which provides
that all damages paid by one spouse to another in settlement of a claim
for personal injuries are separate property of the injured spouse; section
4800(c) which allows personal injury damages to be awarded to the
injured spouse 70 upon divorce; and section 5126, which provides that
personal injury damages shall be separate property of the injured spouse
if received after separation or divorce, subject to certain reimbursement
provisions.71
It is to a discussion of these statutes, and their interpretations by
the California courts, that we now turn.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 1391.
67. The three situations alluded to are recovery of damages after dissolution of
the community, awarding of predissolution recoveries at divorce, and recovery by one
spouse against the other. DAMAGES REPORT, supra note 55, at 1392-94.
68. Cal. Stat. 1968, ch. 457, § 1-6, at 1077-79.
69. CAL. Civ. CODE § 5112 (West 1970).
70. Id. § 4800(c).
71. Section 5126 does not expressly ban dividing a cause of actiol at divorce
as community property, but it has been held that since monies received upon reducing
the cause of action to judgment would be separate property under the statute, it neces-
sarily has the effect of reclassifying at divorce the cause of action itself from commu-
nity property to the separate property of the victim spouse. In re Marriage of Pinto,
28 Cal. App. 3d 86, 104 Cal. Rptr. 371 (1972). To the extent, if any, that Pinto
suggests that a cause of action for damages for predivorce and preseparation lost earn-
ings would be converted into separate property, the result is unacceptable.
Another problem raised by reclassifying the cause of action on divorce was pointed
out in In re Marriage of Pinto, 28 Cal. App. 3d 86, 104 Cal. Rptr. 371 (1972). When,
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Arguments for a Narrow Interpretation of
Civil Code Section 5112
Literally, section 5112 states that imputed contributory negligence
is "not a defense."72 This statute is not directed at a comparative
negligence system in which the fault of a member of the community
would not be a "defense" in a suit seeking community property dam-
ages but would merely pertain to the appropriate measure of damages.
Thus, if section 5112 is taken to mean what it plainly seems to mean,
the statute has no application under the system of comparative negli-
gence adopted in California, and something similar to the McFadden
imputed negligence rule is once more the law in this state.
Before this narrow interpretation is rejected as a step backwards,
however, this result should be examined in the light of California's
comparative negligence doctrine to determine if there may now exist
policy reasons for retaining the McFadden rule which did not exist
under the old contributory negligence doctrine. It is possible that the
injustice resulting from the application of the McFadden rule that
section 5112 sought to correct no longer exists.
In order to examine the operation of the McFadden rule under the
doctrine of comparative negligence, it is helpful to consider an example.
Imagine a situation in which a wife is injured while a passenger in a
community-owned car which her husband is operating. Further imag-
ine that the husband and a third party are each responsible for 50
percent of the causative negligence. What is the result under compara-
tive negligence, supplemented by the McFadden rule, if the community
is held responsible for the negligence of the husband? If the wife sues
the third party for damages to the community car; the award will be
reduced by one-half. That such an application of "imputed" negligence
at dissolution of the marriage, a cause of action in tort is converted from community
property into the victim spouse's separate property (as occurred in Pinto), or where
funds on hand, traceable to a tort recovery, are converted from community to separate
property or divided unequally under section 4800(c), there is probably a taxable event
in which the victim spouse must recognize gain. See Rev. Rul. 76-83, 1976 INT. REv.
BULL. No. 10, at 13.
The taxation considerations would be even more confusing if, in the case of funds
on hand at dissolution that were converted or unequally divided, the jury trying the
tort case had been instructed to reduce damages on account of income taxes that would
have been paid on recovery had it been received as income. That is the rule where
recovery for lost earnings is had against the United States as a defendant, and the
jury would consider, it seems clear, the combined tax bracket of both the victim and
his spouse insofar as recovery would be community property. See Felder v. United
States, 543 F.2d 657 (9th Cir. 1976).
72. CAL. Crv. CODE § 5112 (West 1970).
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is necessary to prevent injustice is obvious once we realize that if the
husband had been denominated the plaintiff, only half the damage to
the car would have been recoverable. 73 Unless we are to allow a proce-
dural device to double the recovery against the third party tortfeasor, the
recovery for damages to the community-owned car ought to be the
same, no matter which spouse is formally the plaintiff.
Surely there is nothing unfair about this result concerning the car,
if we accept marriage as a true partnership. All would agree that the
value of the community property can be reached by the postmarital
creditors of one spouse, whether the other spouse approves or not, but
this will be offset by the earnings of that spouse, which are co-owned. A
spouse's contributory negligence in tort situations will also sometimes
lessen the recovery otherwise going to the community, but this will be
offset in other situations where activities involving risk of tortious con-
duct (e.g., driving to work) generate gains in which the other spouse
shares.
Likewise, if the loss to the community is not a wrecked car but loss
of the salary or other earnings of a spouse for a period during which the
spouses were married and living together, so that such sums if accrued
as anticipated from labor would have been community property, it is just
as fair to apply the McFadden rule and reduce the recovery to the
community by the total amount of negligence of both spouses even
though only one has been injured.
By way of example, suppose that both spouses worked and that the
wife has been injured so that she will be unable to earn $10,000 per year
for five years. If her husband has been 50 percent negligent in causing
the injury, the operation of the marital partnership system, together with
comparative negligence, causes recovery of only half the damages to be
awarded. This is not unjust, since, at the same time, the wife is
obtaining corresponding benefits due to the marital partnership system
by owning as a matter of law half of her husband's continuing paycheck.
But what of recovery for the wife's pain and suffering and for her
disfigurement? Should it be reduced because of her husband's negli-
gence? Unless the proponents of the narrow interpretation of section
5112 are going to take the bizarre position that the injured wife must
"'suffer' for the community,"74 they will concede that such a reduction
73. Note that section 5112 seems not to apply, if taken literally, for another rea-
son. Although "a married person [has been] injured" in the accident, we are not con-
cerned here with "damages for such injury."
74. See W. BROCKELANK, THE Co MMNIrY PROPERTY LAw OF IDAHo 182-84
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is unjust and improper. This injustice results from the California
Supreme Court's classification of this element of recovery as community
property. The proper solution is not to torture the language of section
5112 to bar consideration of the nonplaintiff spouse's share of causative
negligence in determining the appropriate measure of damages under
Li-a solution that would cause a patently improper recovery insofar as
it eliminated a reduction of damages for the plaintiff spouse's lost
earnings during marriage and while the spouses were living together.
Rather, the solution is to classify correctly damages for pain and suffer-
ing as separate property, a result no statute prohibits.
Moreover, the adoption of comparative negligence is a boon to the
community for which inability to claim special benefits under section
5112 is a small and fair price to pay. Surely the great bulk of cases
involving contributory negligence by a married person are those in
which that negligent spouse was also the tort victim. Before Li, there
could be no community recovery at all, even when the third-party
tortfeasor was 90 percent to blame for the accident. Given the benefit
of partial recovery under Li, there is no unfairness in using the imputed
negligence principle to reduce damages in the more unusual case where
one spouse is contributorily negligent and the other is injured, especially
if a logical classification of the damages as community or separate is
made.
Arguments for the Broad Interpretation
of Section 5112
Proponents of a broader reading of section 5112 in a comparative
negligence context will stress that the special relief provided for married
personal injury plaintiffs in the 1957 and 1968 legislation was prompted
by more than dislike for contributory negligence. If so, the elimination
of that doctrine alone does not call for the end of special consideration
for married plaintiffs in personal injury suits.
Prior to both the 1957 and 1968 enactments, it was well settled in
California that if the plaintiff's business partner or joint venturer, in the
course of the business venture, had contributed to the injuries by his
negligence, imputed contributory negligence was a complete defense.75
(1962); Note, Personal Injury Damages and Inheritance and Gilt Taxes: Revenue and
Taxation Code § 13560, 24 HASTINGS L.J. 329, 343 (1973). These commentators stand
alone in contending that the California classification of true personal injury damages
as community property is logical.
75. E.g., Buckley v. Chadwick, 45 Cal. 2d 183, 190, 288 P.2d 12, 15-16 (1955);
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If the legislature had a general distaste for such a defense, the reform
legislation would probably not have been confined to husband-wife
imputed negligence but would also have addressed the unfair operation
of the defense in the area of joint commercial venture. Also, why
would the legislature have limited relief to suits involving injuries to the
person? Why wasn't it thought just as unfair to impute negligence to
bar recovery when damage was to tangible property of the community
or to a spouse's business?
The answer may be that, outside of the "business and property"
context, the legislature felt marriage of a person should never be used to
reduce the recovery that a single person would be able to obtain for
wrongs done to him. That is, for property damage suits, married
persons would be lumped with joint venturers in the commercial area,
properly subject to sharing the risks as well as benefits of partnership.
When it comes, however, to damages for pain, suffering, disfigurement,
medical bills, lost earnings, and the like in personal injury suits, the
sometimes harsh "win a few, lose a few" theory of business partnership
is inappropriate. When dealing with the marital community, some
aspects of strict partnership-for example, the imputing of negligence-
are disregarded; others-for example, shared ownership by the spouses
of community property damages-do not act harshly in this setting and
are retained. This purpose can only be obtained under a comparative
negligence system by interpreting section 5112 to prohibit, when an
injured person sues as plaintiff to recover personal injury damages, the
attributing or imputing to him of any of the non-plaintiff spouse's
negligence.
Thus, if the wife is 30 percent negligent, the husband 20 percent
negligent, and a third-party tortfeasor 50 percent negligent in the wife's
suit against the third party for community property personal injury
damages, her recovery is 70 percent of the damages, not just 50
percent-as would be the result if her spouse's negligence were imputed
to her.76
Coleman v. California Yearly Meeting of Friends Church, 27 Cal. App. 2d 579, 581
P.2d 469, 470 (1938).
76. Against charges that it is unfair to require the third-party tortfeasor to pay
70% of the damages, it must be remembered that, at least until Li, the third party
and the nonplaintiff spouse were jointly and severally liable for all damages not caused
by the negligence of the plaintiff spouse.
Another possibility, not entirely illogical, is that the wife's recovery would be
62.5% of damages (%) on the theory that section 5112 requires that the nonplaintiff
spouse's negligence be disregarded entirely. In other words, of the eight units of fault
allocable between the plaintiff spouse and the third-party tortfeasor, five units belong
It is thus clear that factors other than mere dislike for the defense
of contributory negligence must have been in the minds of the Califor-
nia legislators who enacted section 5112, since nothing was done to
eliminate that defense in contexts other than personal injury suits
brought by a married plaintiff.
Resolving the Dilemma by Reopening the
Classification Question
My own view is that while the 1957 and 1968 California legisla-
tures may have had some distaste for the contributory negligence de-
fense generally, that was not the primary reason for the anti-McFadden
legislation which they enacted. If contributory negligence had been
viewed as the primary evil, rejecting it in favor of comparative negli-
gence certainly would have been discussed as an alternative to what was
done instead. On the other hand, there is nothing in the legislative
history or case law background of section 5112 to suggest that it was
intended to confer special immunities from ordinary tort law defenses to
some plaintiffs simply because they were married.
Rather, I think the legislature perceived that contributory negli-
gence when applied to deny recovery for damages for a married plain-
tiffs pain, suffering, and disfigurement produced unacceptable results-
not because of the imputing of the nonplaintiff spouse's negligence to
the community but because the classification of such damages as com-
munity was erroneous. That is, with respect to the integrity of a
person's own body, there is no element of joint venture, commercial or
to the third party and therefore he should be liable for 5/8 of the damages. According
to Professor Schwartz, however, in the few decisions so far on the question arising
in comparative negligence jurisdictions where multiple tortfeasors are jointly and sever-
ally liable for all damages, the negligence of a tortfeasor not joined as a defendant
is generally treated as part of the negligence of the defendant. Thus, 70%, and not
62.5%, would be the appropriate recovery for the wife in our hypothetical. V.
SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE, 254-55 (1974) (citing Wisconsin cases).
Schwartz also notes that in Arkansas a plaintiff who is 20% negligent can sue a de-
fendant only 10% negligent but can recover 80% of his own (plaintiff's) damages.
Id. at 258-59. On the other hand, in discussing the Li case, Schwartz suggests that
in California, if the plaintiff chooses not to sue certain potential defendants, "he should
not be permitted to allocate fault to them." This would make the case easier for the
jury, for "it permits the jury to make judgments about parties whom they can see and
hear without straining to apportion fault in the abstract." Id., 1975 Supp. at 7. For
a similar suggestion that the Li court may not intend to follow the Wisconsin authori-
ties, see Schwartz Survey, supra note 6, at 762-63. Contra, Comparative Negligence,
supra note 6, at 774 n.30. Schwartz, however, does not cite any portion of Li suggesting
that the California court plans to repudiate the Wisconsin-Arkansas solution to the prob-
lem.
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marital, and no reason to attribute to the plaintiff the negligence of his
spouse. Yet when the damages are related to the commercial joint
venture sharing of the spouses, recognition of the partnership results in
no unfairness.
In sum, section 5112 seems to be the strange offspring of disen-
chantment not with that portion of McFadden attributing to the commu-
nity partnership the negligence of either spouse, but with the all-commu-
nity recovery rule itself. I say "strange" offspring, for if I am correct in
my analysis of what was troubling the legislature, the logical response
would have been to enact a bill requiring California courts to apply a
more sensible rule for classifying the various elements of damages in a
personal injury suit, rather than abolishing contributory negligence as a
defense in such litigation.
Nevertheless, looking beyond section 5112, there is ample evidence
that the legislature was quite troubled by the all-community recovery
rule and was primarily concerned with statutory devices to ameliorate its
unfortunate effects. One such effect was the absurdity of an imputed
contributory negligence defense when part of a married person's body
had been lost in an accident. 7  Section 5112 took care of that problem.
Another was the possibility of treating as community property sums on
hand at divorce that were awarded for future suffering and for lost
earnings yet to accrue following the divorce.7 8 Section 4800(c) took
care of that. 9
Additionally, there was the possibility that the courts might retreat
from the illogical decisions of Flores v. Brown80 and Washington v.
Washington,"' which allowed treating as separate property damages for
future suffering and for future lost earnings yet to accrue after dissolu-
tion of the marriage by death or divorce. Section 5126 took care of
that.
2
77. See note 29 and accompanying text.
78. See 4 R. WrrKiN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNrA LAW, Community Property § 68
(7th ed. 1960). Community property was subject to mandatory 50/50 division in some
situations. If the grounds for divorce were adultery or extreme cruelty, an "innocent"
spouse could be awarded more than half the community property under the law in effect
before 1970. If the "guilty" spouse were the tort victim, the result in such a case
could be especially inequitable.
79. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4800(c) (West Supp, 1977).
80. 39 Cal. 2d 622, 248 P.2d 922 (1952). See text accompanying notes 30-36
supra. See also Comment, The Impact of the Community Property System on Tort
Suits, 42 CALIF. L. REV. 486, 490 (1954).
81. 47 Cal. 2d 249, 302 P.2d 569 (1956).
82. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5126 (West 1970), as amended CAL. CIV. CODE § 5126
(West Supp. 1977). The fact that the only thing the 1957 legislation actually did was
If the primary reason for the 1968 legislation was dislike of the all-
community recovery rule, it must be conceded that the narrow interpre-
tation of section 5112, coupled with continued application of the all-
community recovery rule, will cause a result the legislature did not
intend. If a wife loses a leg and her spouse is 50 percent negligent, the
legislature would not want the wife's damages diminished at all. It
would follow, then, that if for any reason the courts are incapable of
making the initial classification desired by the legislature-that damages
for pain, suffering, and disfigurement are separate property-the broad
interpretation of section 5112 is tolerable. If there is no bar to a proper
classification of elements of damages, then the narrow interpretation-
the literal reading of the statute-is appropriate. It will assure no
reduction of a person's recoverable damages for pain, suffering, and
disfigurement due to a spouse's contributory negligence, while quite
logically and properly lumping together the negligence of both spouses
to reduce damages which are correctly treated as part of the wealth of
the marital partnership.
Are California Courts Free to Overrule the All-Community
Recovery Decisions and Adopt the Nevada Rule?
The approach of the Nevada courts demonstrates that a correct
classification of the rights violated will serve the interests sought to be
protected by section 5112. In the leading case of Frederickson &
Watson Construction Co. v. Boyd,83 the Nevada supreme court, when
faced with the question whether and to what extent Mrs. Boyd would be
barred from recovery from third-party tortfeasors for personal injuries
because of her husband's contributory negligence, held that the character
of the judgment obtained by Mrs. Boyd as separate or community prop-
erty depended on the right violated. The court found that a cause of ac-
tion for personal injury is based on the violation of a separate right, the
right to personal bodily integrity. 4 Recovery for violation of this right
would therefore be Mrs. Boyd's separate property. The court distin-
guished the case of damages arising from the loss of the wife's services
to the community and for medical expenses; these would be community
property. 5
to compel reclassification, using an all-separate rather than an all-community rule, also
suggests that eleven years later in 1968 the legislature was still substantially concerned
with the classification process and not just with "imputed" contributory negligence.
83. 60 Nev. 117, 122, 102 P.2d 627, 629 (1940).
84. Id.
85. Id.
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From 1957 to 1968, the California courts were compelled by
statute to classify personal injury damages in a particular manner 6 and
thus were not free to adopt the better reasoned Nevada approach. The
1968 legislation, however, changed the situation. 7  Only one statute
even refers to personal injury damages as community property, and does
so in a most tangential way. 8 Hence, even if the Law Revision
Commission did think the all-community recovery rule was sound,89 the
statutes it recommended and which the legislature enacted in 1968
simply do not tie the courts' hands on the classification issue.
The California courts have at times suggested that what is now
Civil Code section 5110 compels the all-community recovery rule.90
Under it, "all personal property wherever situated acquired during the
marriage... is community property... [e]xcept as provided in sections
5107, 5108, and 5109 .... ,91 But sections 5107 and 5108 provide that
"all property owned by [one spouse] before marriage" is his separate
property.92  These statutes could be seen as compelling classification as
separate property of those damages received by a spouse to compensate
him for loss of a leg (his property before marriage) to the same extent
that section 5110 compels classifying a recovery for lost earnings during
marriage as community property.
Actually, sections 5107, 5108, and 5110 are merely legislative
efforts to codify basic principles of community property law applicable
when specific classification provisions addressed to particular types of
property are not themselves dispositi've.93 Resort must be had to the
86. See notes 50-71 and accompanying text supra.
87. With the exception, of course, of such damages recovered by one spouse
against the other, which must be separate property under CAL. CIrv. CODE § 5109 (West
1970). But see Note, Personal Injury Damages and Inheritance and Gift Taxes-Reve-
nue and Taxation Code Section 13560, 24 HASTnNGS LJ. 329, 343 (1973) (making
the unique assertion that the 1968 statutes themselves reclassify personal injury damages
from all-separate to all-community).
88. CAL. Civ. CODE § 4800(c) (West 1970). See note 62 & accompanying text
supra. This statute allows community property personal injury damages to be awarded
to the injured spouse upon dissolution of the marriage. Even if the California courts
adopt the Nevada rule, there will still be some personal injury damages to which this
statute could apply, i.e., lost earnings and medical expenses.
89. The commission's passing comment that the damages "should be community"
is inconsistent with numerous other passages of its report which criticized the all-com-
munity recovery rule, and with the purpose of several of the proposed statutes. See
notes 53-59 & accompanying text.
90. E.g., Zaragosa v. Craven, 33 Cal. 2d 315, 319, 202 P.2d 73, 75 (1949).
91. CAL. CrV. CODE § 5110 (West 1970), as amended CAL. Crv. CODE. § 5110
(West Supp. 1977).
92. Id. §§ 5107, 5108 (West 1970).
93. Consideration of the Spanish civil law concepts of onerous and lucrative title
doctrine of tracing, which is not codified, but which is a basic tenet of
community property law. 4 If damages can be traced back to a foot or
arm of the spouse or to a legal right not to be tortiously subjected to
pain and suffering, then the combination of the tracing rule and sections
5107 and 5108 dictates classifying damages for disfigurement or for
pain and suffering as the victim spouse's separate property. No reason
was given in McFadden for the refusal there to trace back beyond the
accrual of the cause of action itself which (since that happened during
marriage) led to the all-community recovery rule in California. The
error in McFadden's refusal to trace was at once observed by the
Supreme Court of Nevada when it was for the first time called upon to
classify such damages in Fredrickson & Watson Construction Co. v.
Boyd. Where the wife had been injured, the Nevada court divided the
recovery into separate property of the wife for damages for her pain and
suffering traceable to her separately owned right of personal security
and into community property damages for lost earnings, lost services,
and medical expenses. The Nevada rule was adopted in New Mexico,
again on the basis of tracing portions of the damages back to the victim
spouse's separate rights, the New Mexico court stating: "A person has
no more property in a right to recover for a lost arm or leg, than he had
in the arm or leg itself."95
In 1972, the Texas Supreme Court repudiated many years of
adherence to an all-community recovery rule similar to California's by
adopting the Nevada rule on the ground that it was in accordance with
basic principles of Spanish law.9 6 Finally, in a case in which it also
is often essential in making an appropriate classification. See, e.g., Bradley v. Bradley,
540 S.W.2d 504, 512 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976); In re Salvini's Estate, 65 Wash. 2d 442,
445-47, 397 P.2d 811, 812-13 (1964); Andrews v. Andrews, 116 Wash. 513, 519-22, 199
P. 981, 984 (1921). With respect to the problem of classifying personal injury damages
for pain and suffering and disfigurement, however, de Funiak and Vaughn aptly state
that the Spanish concepts of onerous and lucrative title provide no solution. W. DE
FUNIAK & M. VAUGHN, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY § 82 (2d ed. 1971). The
significant inquiry is into the classification of the rights from which the cause of action
and damages stem-the "property" which the money awarded takes the place of.
94. Id. § 77. See note 29 supra.
95. Soto v. Vandeventer, 56 N.M. 483, 489, 245 P.2d 826, 829 (1952).
96. Graham v. Franco, 488 S.W.2d 390 (Tex. 1972). The decision upheld a
Texas statute abrogating the all-community recovery rule, TEx. FAM. CODE § 5.01(a) (3)
(1970), which had been established by case law on the very theory used in McFadden.
Exell v. Dodson, 60 Tex. 331 (1883). Graham construed the Texas Constitution as
adopting basic classification principles of Spanish-Mexican community property law.
488 S.W.2d at 395. The historical context in which this case arose deserves note. In
1915 the Texas legislature had passed a statute somewhat like California's 1957 act,
making all of the wife's personal injury recovery separate property. The statute was
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abolished spousal immunity, the Idaho Supreme Court in 1975 repudiat-
ed numerous all-community recovery decisions in favor of the Nevada
rule.7
[W]e believe the correct concept is first to consider the nature of
the right or interest invaded or harmed by the negligence of a de-
fendant, and based on a determinization [sic] of the nature of this
right, then to characterize the damages recovered in relation to the
right violated. Thus, the character of any judgment in this type
of case as separate or community would take its character from the
nature of the right violated.
held to violate the Texas Constitution in Northern Texas Traction Co. v. Hill, 297 S.W.
778 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927). According to Graham this decision was correct, not for
the stated reason (the all-community recovery rule) but because the statute wrongly clas-
sified as separate property damages recovered for the wife's lost earnings. 488 S.W.2d
at 396. See generally Note, The Texas Community Property Defense: An Obituary,
10 HousT. L. REV. 958 (1973). Louisiana has also abrogated by statute the all-com-
munity recovery rule with respect to damages recovered by the wife. LA. Civ. CoqE
ANN. art. 2334, 2402 (West 1971). The Louisiana statute is construed, however, to
make separate only damages for pain and suffering, ahd disfigurement, not those for the
wife's lost earnings or for expenses of her medical treatment.
97. Rogers v. Yellowstone Park Co., 97 Idaho 14, 539 P.2d 566 (1975). Rogers
was a case in which one spouse sued the other for damages. The Idaho court did not,
after speaking approvingly of it, apply the Nevada rule, but adopted rather the Washing-
ton interspousal suit precedent of Freehe v. Freehe, 81 Wash. 2d 183, 500 P.2d 771
(1972). That case allowed the victim spouse to recover only half of his lost earnings,
the amount recovered becoming the plaintiffs separate property.
I do not view Rogers as abandoning the all-community recovery rule only in inter-
spousal suits. Guy v. Guy, - Idaho - 560 P.2d 876, 879 (1977). The great bulk of
the opinion constitutes dicta attacking the all-community-recovery rule and lauding the
Nevada approach. It approvingly cites Nevada, Texas, and New Mexico cases outside
the interspousal immunity area where the Nevada classification approach was utilized
and California's rejected. The Rogers court appears to have been inviting trial judges
in Idaho to henceforth use the Nevada rule in cases where the defendant is not the
plaintiff's spouse. Cf. Comment, Limitations on Personal Injury Tort Litigation by
Married Persons in Community Property States: Inter-Spousal Immunity and the Com-
munity Property Classification of Personal Injury Recovery, 11 IDAHO L. REV. 225
(1975). But see Note, The Husband's Recovery of Personal Injury Damages after
Judicial Separation, 36 LA. L. REV. 1029, 1039 n.50 (1976).
If my interpretation is correct, the California rule is now a minority position, with
Idaho, Texas, Nevada, New Mexico, and Louisiana (as to wives) rejecting it. The all-
community recovery rule does seem to be alive and well in several states. See, e.g.,
Tinker v. Hobbs, 80 Ariz. 166, 294 P.2d 659 (1956); Fox Tuscon Theatres Corp. v.
Lindsay, 47 Ariz. 388, 56 P.2d 183 (1936); Ostheller v. Spokane & I.E.R. Co., 107
Wash. 678, 182 P. 3 (1919); Schneider v. Biberger, 76 Wash. 504, 136 P. 701 (1913);
Perez v. Perez, 11 Wash. App. 429,'523 P.2d 455 (1974). In Louisiana the rule applies
when the husband is injured. McHenry v. American Employers' Insurance Co., 206 La.
70, 18 So. 2d 656 (1944). But cf. LA. Cxv. CODE art. 2334 (West 1971) (husband's
recovery separate if at time of injury he was living separate and apart from his wife
due to her fault).
When a couple marry they bring to the marriage not only their
property, but also themselves as individuals. While they enter into
common bonds, still they are entitled to maintain certain individual
rights. One of those rights is that of personal security and free-
dom from harm to one's person from the spouse. Any physical in-jury to a spouse and the pain and suffering therefrom is an
injury to the spouse as an individual. 98
Similar logic has repeatedly been pressed on the California court by
Justice Carter in separate opinions. 9 To me it seems irrefutable in the
typical case of injury to the very body one spouse brought to the
marriage that damages for pain, suffering, and disfigurement should be
classified as separate property.
The Policy Against Splitting a Cause of Action as a
Ground for Refusal To Adopt the Nevada Approach
In the Washington case, the California Supreme Court seems to
concede that the all-community recovery rule is unsound in many of its
applications. It is noteworthy that the rule is no longer defended on the
theory that the cause of action arises during marriage and that tracing
back to some antecedent source is impossible. Rather, it is said that the
all-community recovery rule "protects the community interest in the
elements that clearly should belong to it," and it is apparently for this
reason that "[a] rule permitting apportionment of the damages . . . has
never been adopted." 100 But the Nevada rule protects the separate estate
98. 97 Idaho at 18, 539 P.2d at 570 (citations omitted).
99. See, e.g., Kesler v. Pabst, 43 Cal. 2d 254, 260, 273 P.2d 257, 260 (Carter,
J. dissenting). See notes 24-24a, 31 & accompanying text.
100. Washington v. Washington, 47 Cal.2d 249, 253-54, 302 P.2d 569, 571 (1975).
Note, too, as the California Supreme Court had pointed out earlier, that once the com-
munity is dissolved by death "it becomes possible to segregate the elements of damages
that would, except for the community property system, be considered personal to each
spouse." Flores v. Brown, 39 Cal. 2d 622, 631, 248 P.2d 922, 926 (1952).
It is ironic that, while shunning any apportionment of personal injury recoveries
into community and separate components, California has been the leader among the
community property jurisdictions in requiring apportionment in other areas. For ex-
ample, California is one state willing to treat a debt at dissolution of the community
as part community, part separate. See Weinberg v. Weinberg, 67 Cal. 2d 557, 432
P.2d 709, 63 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967) (although one could quarrel with the factual con-
clusion here that a portion of the debt was community). See also Babcock v. Tam,
156 F.2d 116 (9th Cir. 1946) (Arizona law), which takes an all or nothing approach
to the characterization problem on facts strongly suggesting the tortious activity was
related to both community and separate endeavors. California was also the leader in
requiring an apportionment where a separately owned business has grown in value
because of a combination of separate capital and community skill. See cases reviewed
in Beam v. Bank of America, 6 Cal. 3d 12, 490 P.2d 257, 98 Cal. Rptr. 137 (1971).
Interestingly, Nevada, which originated the theory that apportionment was impossible
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of a victim with respect to what he or she should own, as well as
protecting what is legislatively classified as community property. The
McFadden approach is necessary to supply protection only if it is legally
impossible to make a Nevada-style apportionment, so that the only alter-
native to an all-community rule is an all-separate rule.
One possible reason for refusal to segregate community from sepa-
rate damages could be a mystical notion of "one accident, one cause of
action," at least when the possible separate claimants are the united flesh
of husband and wife (to use the English common law fiction, a notion
completely inappropriate in a community property jurisdiction). But
"one accident, one cause of action" never has been the law of California.
In the first California case to consider the rights arising when a married
woman was injured, Tell v. Gibson, decided in 1884, the court said:
[T]he wrongful act which caused the injury to her may involve two
distinct wrongs, for which the law gives two distinct causes of
action: one to the wife, to recover damages for the injury to her;
another to the husband, to recover damages for the consequential
injury to him caused by the loss of services of his wife, and the
expenses incurred by her injuries.' 0'
Although this precise holding was rejected in McFadden, it was not on
the theory that one accident could not create multiple legal rights, for
soon after McFadden, the court in Moody v. Southern Pacific Co.10.2
declared that where the wife is injured, joinder with her husband as
plaintiff was required in a suit to recover community owned damages for
her personal injuries (i.e., pain, suffering, and disfigurement damages),
but that the husband may also have
a separate action which he is entitled to maintain in his own name
for damages which are caused to him by reason of his wife's injuries,
such as the loss of her service and medical and other expenses in-
curred .... 103
And, of course, where property is harmed in the same accident in which
the spouses are injured, a separate cause of action can arise. Thus, in
Scoville v. Keglar,'04 Mr. and Mrs. Scoville were both injured while
in such a circumstance, Lake v. Lake, 18 Nev. 361, 4 P. 711 (1884), has now conceded
that California was correct and follows the California apportionment rule, Johnson v.
Johnson, 89 Nev. 244, 510 P.2d 625 (1973), while California still rejects Nevada's
apportionment approach in personal injury cases.
101. 66 Cal. 247, 248, 5 P. 223, 224 (1884).
102. 167 Cal. 786, 141 P. 388 (1914).
103. Id. at 789, 141 P. at 390.
104. 27 Cal. App. 2d 17, 80 P.2d 162 (1938). One issue before the court was
whether the husband or his estate was a necessary party, since on the husband's death
before final judgment, the attempt to substitute his estate for him as a plaintiff was
found not to be timely.
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driving in a car separately owned by Mrs. Scoville. The car was also
damaged. The court said that all recoverable damages would be com-
munity property except for $600 found by the trial court to be the
appropriate recovery for damages to the car. This could be awarded
even if Mrs. Scoville alone brought the suit (at this time she had no
management power over community property), for this was her separate
property.
It is true that in a few cases the Nevada rule, by recognizing some
separate property recovery, may technically create two causes of action
where previously there was one under McFadden.1°5 If it is felt this
may cause needless hardship to the tortfeasor by subjecting him to
multiple suits, the remedy is not to reject the Nevada rule but to impose
a requirement of joinder of the two causes of action. This seems to
have been done by the court in Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.,'
where overruling what was thought to have been settled law, the court
fashioned a cause of action for loss of consortium. 107 Where, for
example, the husband has been seriously injured in a fashion giving rise
both to a cause of action for his injuries and to a cause of action for his
wife's loss of consortium, the defendant can insist on the husband and
wife joining their actions against him. Rodriguiez is also pertinent to
the present inquiry for the observation by the court that the jury can be
trusted to segregate the wife's loss from her husband's in such a case. 08
If the jury can be trusted to give a monetary value to such elements as
"'love, companionship, affection, society, sexual relations, [and]
solace' ,o9 in determining the amount of damages to be awarded for
loss of consortium, then surely a jury in an ordinary personal injury case
105. As to the California definition of a cause of action, see Comparative Negli-
gence, supra note 6, at 795.
106. 12 Cal. 3d 382, 407, 525 P.2d 669, 115 Cal. Rptr. 765 (1974). Only one
commentator I have found defends the all-community recovery rule on the ground that
it avoids splitting up of a single cause of action. Basically, he reasons that recognizing
some separate as well as community ownership introduced "complexity." Brunn, Cal-
ifornia Personal Injury Damage Awards to Married Persons, 13 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 587,
606 (1966). Actually, it eliminates the complexities of having to reclassify at dissolu-
tion.
107. 12 Cal. 3d at 408, 525 P.2d at 686, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 782. Rodriguez does
not answer the interesting question whether the recovery for loss of consortium is com-
munity or separate. See REPPY & DE FUNIAK, COMMUNITY PROPERTY IN THE UNITED
STATES 206 (1975). Presumably it is community, as the right infringed on did not
exist prior to marriage.
108. 12 Cal. 3d at 406, 525 P.2d at 685, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 781.
109. Id. at 405, 525 P.2d at 684, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 780, quoting Millington v.
Southeastern Elevator Co., 22 N.Y.2d 498, 502, 239 N.E.2d 897, 899, 293 N.Y.S.2d
305, 308 (1968).
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should be able to segregate one spouse's damages for pain, suffering,
and disfigurement (as to which the noninjured spouse's contributory
negligence is irrelevant) from the community's damages for lost earn-
ings and medical expenses.
In sum, the Nevada rule need not involve any splitting of a single
cause of action, and the fear that juries will be unable properly to
segregate the damages is no basis for rejecting the Nevada approach.
Other Objections to the Nevada Rule
The simplest argument to make (but also perhaps the simplest to
reject) for retaining the all-community recovery rule of classification is
that it makes litigation easier. Under the all-community recovery rule,
one set of instructions to the jury would cover all of the damages. 1 °
Although contributory negligence is a much easier system on the courts
than comparative negligence, this was no barrier to the Li decision. If
the California courts conclude that the Nevada rule is appropriate and
McFadden is in error, the ease of applying McFadden will not prevent
its demise.
Second, the law's general preference for community ownership"'
could be cited in support of the present California rule, particularly now
that the state has provided for nondiscriminatory equal management by
husband and wife of most community property." 2 It is certainly true
that marital property management is facilitated if all assets are of the
same class, especially if both spouses have management power over
them. But that policy would lead to adoption of the general community
found in some European countries, 1" 3 whereas California's constitution
and statutes recognize the existence of separate property." 4 Since
110. Of course, this would not be so if additional causes of action as for loss of
consortium or damage to personal property separately owned were joined.
111. See, e.g., Volz v. Zang, 113 Wash. 378, 194 P. 409 (1920).
112. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5125(a) (West Supp. 1977). "Equal" management means
each spouse alone can act, as opposed to "dual" or "joint" management whereby both
husband and wife must act together in order to make a valid transaction. See Reppy,
Retroactivity of the 1975 California Community Property Reforms, 48 S. CAL. L. REV.
977, 980-81 (1975). In California, equal management ends when either spouse diverts
community funds to a business from which the other spouse is excluded, or deposits
them in a bank account in the spouse's own name alone. CAL. Crv. CODE § 5125(d)
(West Supp. 1977); CAL. FIN. CODE §§ 851, 7601, 11200 (West Supp. 1977).
113. See Vaughn, The Policy of Community Property and Inter-Spousal Transac-
tions, 19 BAYLOR L. RExV. 20 (1967). In its extreme form, a general community ex-
cludes separate ownership of property.
114. CAL. CONST. art. 21 (West Supp. 1977); CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 5107-09 (West
1970).
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separate property does exist, the courts have a duty to recognize it as
such in a given case.
It must also be remembered that while assuring equal management
of all of the damages awarded to the victim spouse by following McFad-
den may seem desirable, the misclassified property becomes available
to a large additional class of creditors. That is, so long as a spouse's
personal injury damages for pain, suffering, and disfigurement are
classified as his separate property, only the spouse's own creditors can
seize the funds.115 But if the funds are community property, creditors
of the nonvictim spouse can seize them." 6  And if the debt were the
nonvictim's spouse's community obligation, his spouse would not even
have a claim for reimbursement at dissolution of the marriage"' on the
ground she was taken advantage of 118 when her damages for pain and
suffering were used in that manner, for there is nothing innately unjust
about paying community debts with community property.
Moreover, if after a separate property award is made to the wife or
husband under the Nevada rule, and the victim spouse would like to
have the benefits of equal management applied to such funds, the
recipient can make his spouse his agent, with power along with him, to
control such funds. Or he could transmute the funds from separate to
community property." 9
115. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5121 (West Supp. 1977). This section and section 5132
contain an exception for debts contracted by the other spouse to supply necessaries
of life or support. CAL. CIv. CODE § 5132 (West Supp. 1977).
116. CAL. CIv. CODE § 5116 (West Supp. 1977). An exception in section 5120
for debts of a spouse "contracted" before marriage (and separate for this reason) would
not apply, for that exception insulates only the nondebtor spouse's "earnings", which
do not include personal injury damages. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5120 (West Supp. 1977).
Aside from section 5120, the Washington-Arizona concept of classifying debts as sep-
arate and community is not utilized in California to determine what property a creditor
can reach. (Section 5122 creates a "pecking order" of liability based on the community
versus separate debt theory, but it does not exempt property as Washington-Arizona
law does. CAL. CIv. CODE § 5122 (West Supp. 1977)). The community versus separate
debt system is applied, however, to determine what reimbursement rights may be asserted
at dissolution of the community. Weinberg v. Weinberg, 67 Cal. 2d 557, 432 P.2d
709, 63 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967); Marriage of Walker, 57 Cal. App. 3d 802, 129 Cal.
Rptr. 351 (1976); Williams v. Williams, 14 Cal. App. 3d 560, 92 Cal. Rptr. 385 (1971).
117. See cases cited note 116 supra.
118. Professor Horowitz, places his objection to the all-community recovery rule
on grounds that it is unfair to have damages recovered for a married person's pain
and suffering be used to pay community obligations. Horowitz, Conflict of Law Prob-
lems in Community Property, 11 WASH. L. REV. 212, 229 (1936).
119. W. DE FUNIAK & M. VAUGHN, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY § 144
(2d ed. 1971). A substantial transmutation might incur a gift tax. See Estate of Rog-
ers, 24 Cal, App. 3d 69, 100 Cal. Rptr. 735 (1972); Comment, Personal Injury Dam-
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A quite different basis for objecting to the Nevada rule might be
that the tracing test is sometimes unworkable. For example, suppose
the tort is defamation of the wife. Is the jury to consider whether the
particular elements of her reputation at issue were acquired before or
after marriage? Of course, it is not easy to apply the tracing theory in
such instances, but that difficulty can be answered by invoking the
presumption in favor of community ownership, so that there is no need to
brand the Nevada rule as a whole unsound. That is, unless the court is
convinced that the wife has satisfactorily traced the cause of action to
some property or pre-marital right-such as part of her body or a legally
created protection of bodily integrity-the cause of action or damages
must be community-owned as property acquired by a spouse during
marriage. 120
Departing from the all-community recovery rule (especially together
with adoption of the narrow interpretation of section 5112) can also be
criticized as encouraging the manipulating of the nature of recoverable
damages to assure separate ownership or to avoid imputed contributory
negligence which would decrease the amount of recoverable damages.
Although several Nevada rule decisions state that damages to compen-
sate for the victim's medical expenses are community property,12' these
decisions seem to be based on an assumption that since community funds
would be liable for medical expenses incurred during marriage, they were
in fact so used. The Texas Supreme Court has more carefully considered
the problem and has said: "To the extent that the marital partnership has
incurred medical or other expenses . . . both spouses have been dam-
aged . . . The recovery, therefore, is community in character.' '122
But what if, prior to the assessment of damages, separate property of the
victim spouse has been used to pay hospital bills and medical expenses,
and suppose, too, that the recommended narrow interpretation of sec-
tion 5112 is adopted, and the husband has been concurrently negligent
along with the third-party defendant? Can reduction of damages be
avoided by the device of not using community property to pay the bills?
Keslar v. Pabst'2- held that a postaccident, prejudgment contract
between a husband and wife whereby the husband relinquished all
ages and Inheritance and Gift Taxes, Revenue & Taxation Code § 13560, 24 HASTINGS
L.L 329 (1973).
120. E.g., Lyman v. Vorwerk, 13 Cal. App. 507, 110 P. 355 (1910).
121. Rogers v. Yellowstone Park Co., 95 Idaho 14, 539 P.2d 566 (1975); Fred-
erickson & Watson Constr. Co. v. Boyd, 60 Nev. 117, 102 P.2d 627 (1940) (semble);
Soto v. Vandeventer, 56 N.M. 483, 245 P.2d 826 (1952). See also Kesler v. Pabst,
43 Cal. 2d 254, 264, 273 P.2d 257, 263 (1954) (Carter, J., dissenting).
122. Graham v. Franco, 488 S.W.2d 390, 396 (Tex. 1972).
123. 43 Cal. 2d 254, 273 P.2d 257 (1954).
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interest in all recoverable damages, was ineffective to eliminate the
operation of the McFadden rule.12 Subsequently, however, the su-
preme court permitted what was plainly a bona fide divorce, not entered
into to improve tort litigation posture, to create a cause of action
previously barred by McFadden.'25 These California cases suggest
that if the medical bills were paid from separate funds for bona fide
reasons-for example, if the wife had married the husband shortly
before the accident and carried medical insurance, which had paid her
hospital and doctor bills and which she had purchased entirely with
premarriage separate earnings-any recovery to reimburse for such
expenses would also be separate.
Addressing a similar problem, one Texas commentator suggests
that a rule allowing any separate payment of such expenses prior to
judgment to defeat a contributory negligence claim is unfair to families
where the injured spouse has no separate property. 126  He concludes
that the more equitable criterion for the classification of medical expen-
ses is the "intrinsic nature of the debt,"' 127 namely, that the burden of
paying for the necessary medical services furnished to the injured spouse
should fall to the community. Under this line of reasoning, "the source
of payment should be immaterial to classification because of the fixed
community nature of the liability." '128 But even this writer recognizes
that if separate property were used to pay the bills and the spouses were
separated at the time, a separate property classification would be appro-
priate, a result that is statutorily compelled in California by Civil Code
section 5126,12'9 at least where the spouses do not reconcile before the
recovery is received.
Under section 5126, a bona fide divorce or separation can improve
the injured spouse's financial position by converting some community
recovery into separate property (e.g., for lost earnings). This is so
124. See text accompanying notes 46-49 supra.
125. See text accompanying notes 37-38 supra.
126. Comment, Reclassification of Tort Recoveries by Spouses-Possible Effects
of Graham v. Franco, 4 TEXAS TECH. L. REv. 359, 373 (1973).
127. Id.
128. Id. The writer suggests that the remedy for the separate estate where in fact
separate funds have been used to discharge the medical debts is a claim for reimburse-
ment at dissolution of the community. Id. at 373-74. See also Brunn, California Per-
sonal Injury Damage Awards to Married Persons, 13 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 587, 591 (1966).
Brunn indicates that reimbursement to the community was the remedy when community
property had prior to judgment been used to pay medical bills but the 1957 statute had
compelled the recovery based on those expenses to be classified as separate property of
the victim spouse.
129. CAL. CIv. CODE § 5126 (West Supp. 1977).
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whether the Nevada rule or all-community recovery rule is used in the
ordinary case where the married plaintiff is not separated. In addition,
if the narrow interpretation of section 5112 is adopted, the bona fide
divorce or separation can eliminate the reduction of otherwise communi-
ty damages due to the percentage of negligence of the nonplaintiff
spouse. Thus, it should not be startling if a bona fide payment of
medical bills with separate property should also increase recoverable
damages.
It would be unfortunate, of course, to create another litigable issue
in the bona fides of the use of separate property to pay such debts before
the tort suit judgment. If the courts consider this to be a serious prob-
lem, it is not necessary to resolve it by rejecting the Nevada rule in favor
of continued adherence to the all-community recovery doctrine. The
Texas commentator has an adequate solution in defining this element of
damages as intrinsically community without regard to the actual source
of payment.
The 1968 Legislation and the Harmful Effects
of the AII-Community Recovery Rule
Finally, it can be argued that no reason for abandoning McFadden
in favor of the Nevada rule exists, on the ground that the 1968 legisla-
tive package cured all the undesirable effects of the all-community
recovery doctrine in California. Unfortunately, the latter premise is also
demonstrably false. It has already been noted that under the all-
community recovery rule, damages paid on account of pain, suffering,
and disfigurement of the wife can be reached by community creditors
(without her having any claim for reimbursement) and by the hus-
band's separate creditors (with his wife being able to claim reimburse-
ment at dissolution of the community for half the amount taken.) 130
The 1968 reforms offer no solution to this problem. Although section
4800(c) attempts to ameliorate the unfairness of the McFadden rule on
divorce, 3' no statute authorizes any corrective measures when the com-
130. See notes 115-16 & accompanying text supra.
131. See note 70 supra. Application of the statute raises a problem of interpreta-
tion. What is the scope of "community property personal injury damages" which are
in the ordinary case to be awarded entirely to the victim spouse notwithstanding the
mandate of section 4800(a) for an equal division of community property? The phrase
logically must include damages for pain, suffering, and disfigurement, as well as dam-
ages for the victim spouse's future lost earnings and future medical expenses. But what
of sums still on hand compensating for the victim's lost earnings prior to separation
of the spouses? There is no reason at all not to make an equal division of these.
The courts can be expected routinely to invoke the "interests of justice" escape clause
munity is dissolved by death. If the nonvictim spouses dies first, he can
bequeath half of the money on hand that was awarded to the survivor
not only to compensate her for pain and suffering during marriage
(which is logically separate in character) but for postdissolution pain and
suffering and lost earnings of the survivor-which are not even arguably
community in nature-and for continuing disfigurement. " 2  The logic
of Flores v. Brown and Washington v. Washington compels the conclu-
sion that this is unfair.
Adoption of the Nevada rule is a partial answer. At least half of
the sums on hand traceable to the award for pain, suffering, and
disfigurement could not be bequeathed away from the victim by the
surviving spouse under the Nevada approach. Where damages are
received, during marriage and while the spouses are still living together,
for future lost earnings and future medical expenses, they must be
classified under any rule as community property at the time. There is
no statute reclassifying from community property to the separate proper-
ty of the victim spouse any part of these funds as may still be on hand at
dissolution of the community by death. Perhaps the same logic that led
the court itself to reclassify the cause of action existing at dissolution by
death from community to separate property of the surviving spouse in
Flores v. Brown15 3 can produce a reclassification in this case as well as
in section 4800(c) in order to divide this type of "community property personal injury
damages" equally. Indeed, it would probably be reversible error in most cases not to
do so. Preferably, section 4800(c) should be amended to make clear that the legisla-
ture never considered the classification at divorce of this element of damages as commu-
nity property to be improper.
Another problem meriting attention is the situation which arises if section 4800(c)
community property personal injury damages are mixed in one bank account with other
community property, such as a spouse's earnings, and withdrawals are made for living
expenses, investments, payment of separate debts, and the like. Is it assumed that the
section 4800(c) property is withdrawn first? Last? Pro rata with the other property?
Does the manner in which the withdrawal is spent affect the decision? See generally
W. REPPY & W. DE FUNIAK, COMMUNITY PROPERTY IN THE UNITED STATES 146-62
(1975).
132. Since the Law Revision Commission was critical of the effect of the 1957
statute that the victim spouse could give away or bequeath all of the award intended
to compensate for lost earnings during marriage, it is astonishing that it recommended
legislation apparently sanctioning the mirror image problem, whereby the rights of the
victim spouse in future lost earnings can be defeated at the other's death. See DAM-
AGES REPORT, supra note 55, at 1389-90.
133. 39 Cal. 2d 622, 248 P.2d 922 (1952). See text accompanying notes 32-34
supra. See also West v. Ortego, 325 So. 2d 242 (La. 1975). In West the husband
received a workmen's compensation settlement after dissolution which included damages
for wage loss before and after separation. The court apportioned the recovery into
sums intended to compensate for pre- and post-dissolution damages, holding that the
benefits were the husband's separate property to the extent that they compensated for
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to assure that none of the damages for future lost earnings and future
medical expenses can be bequeathed away from the surviving victim
spouse.' 3 4
Where the damages are received after the dissolution of the com-
munity, Civil Code section 5126 35 does in part relieve the courts of the
necessity of using the Nevada rule to obtain the appropriate result.
However, the statute has been awkwardly and overbroadly drafted and
requires some courageous judicial interpretation if what is surely the
intent of the legislature is to be achieved. 136
post-dissolution loss of earnings. The opinion provides a more careful analysis of the
problem than either Flores or Washington. See also Note, Community Property-Effect
of Dissolution on Damages for Husband's Personal Injury-The Loss Suffered Test,
46 TULANE L. REV. 836 (1972).
134. A statute similar to section 4800(c) which would reclassify the damages at
dissolution of the community by death of the non-victim spouse is recommended. See
CAL. CIv. CODE § 4800(c) (West Supp. 1972). Alternatively, Probate Code section
201 could be amended to remove the decedent's power of testamentary disposition over
his community half interest in sums awarded to compensate the surviving victim-spouse
for future lost earning and medical expenses, leaving the survivor to inherit this share
by intestate succession. Cf. CAL. PROB. CODE § 201 (West 1956). I am not troubled
by the existing bar to the victim spouse's bequeathing away more than half such damages
when she is the first to die.
Absent corrective legislation, there are limits on the extent the courts can create
judge-made rules of reclassification to cure flaws perceived in the community property
system. Consider the case in which the victim's spouse dies and the victim remarries,
possessing at the time of remarriage considerable monies awarded for future (i.e., post-
remarriage) lost earnings and medical expenses. It could be contended with some logic
that these ought to be treated as community property of the second marriage. However,
Civil Code sections 5107 and 5108 literally make the property separate property of
the victim. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 5107-08 (West 1970); see Broussard v. Broussard, 340
So. 2d 1309, 1311-12 (La. 1976). Moreover, the victim's new spouse knowingly entered
into a relationship in which no community earnings would be generated by the previ-
ously injured spouse. An antenuptial contract could have been entered into to take
account of this fact (transmuting some of the tort damages to community property of
the second marriage or equalizing the new spouse's status by designating the earnings
of the victim's new spouse as also separate). See, e.g., Marriage of Dawley, 17 Cal.
3d 342, 551 P.2d 323, 131 Cal. Rptr. 3 (1976). See also CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 5133-
36 (West 1970). The case in which the new husband or wife deliberately and know-
ingly enters into a "separate property marriage" can be distinguished from that in which
reclassification from community property to separate is necessary because of the unanti-
pated death of the nonvictim spouse whose will does not leave any community interest
in lost earnings and medical expense damages to the surviving spouse. See generally
Bodenheimer, The Community Without Community Property: The Need for Legislative
Attention to Separate-Property Marriages Under Community Property Laws, 8 CAL.
WEST. L. REv. 381 (1972).
135. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5126 (West Supp. 1977). See note 129 supra.
136. The problem is that if "damages for personal injuries" which are converted
to separate property when received after separation of the spouses (and I must assume
the courts will find such separation to have occurred when a spouse has died) include
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In sum, the 1968 statutory package has by no means rectified all of
the ill effects of McFadden and that legislation neither bars adopting nor
provides any reason for refusing to adopt the Nevada rule of classifica-
tion.
The Effect of a Broad or Narrow Interpretation of
Section 5112 on Contribution Problems "7
If a married person (for example, the husband) and a third party,
by their concurrent negligence, injure the wife and if she compels the
third-party defendant to pay more than his fair share in damages, the
basis for asserting a claim of contribution among joint tortfeasors aris-
es. 1 38  Since whether section 5112 is given a broad or narrow interpre-
tation-and the subsidiary issue whether to adopt the Nevada rule of
classification-may have an effect on the way contribution principles
operate in such a case, it is appropriate to examine such effects with the
thought that if either the broad or the narrow interpretation of section
5112 significantly complicates the contribution process, there is at least
some basis for rejecting it.
Of course, to the extent that the plaintiff spouse obtains any
community recovery in such a situation, interpretation of section 5112
a recovery for lost earnings that would have accrued prior to dissolution of the commu-
nity or separation, section 5126 operates in an absurd manner. Under any logic, such
damages must be community property. The solution may be to construe "damages for
personal injuries" as meaning only those for pain, suffering, and disfigurement. Basic
nonstatutory principles could be relied on to reclassify from community to separate sums
awarded for post dissolution lost earnings and medical expenses. See note 133 & ac-
companying text supra.
The preferable solution is a legislative amendment to section 5126 expressly ex-
cluding from it damages for lost earnings that would have accrued before separation
and for medical expenses paid with community property.
While the legislature is at it, it can amend section 5126(b), which at present allows
reimbursement to the community for recovery of medical expenses reclassified by sec-
tion 5126(a) into separate property if paid by "the spouse of the injured person" with
community funds. Such reimbursement is appropriate whether the victim spouse or the
other spouse uses community funds to make the payment. Fortunately, the language
of 5126(b) at present does not bar the courts from creating as a matter of judge-made
law such a right of reimbursement when the victim spouse is the payor. See notes
116 & 128 supra.
137. See V. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE § 16.7 (1974); Fleming, Com-
parative Negligence at Last-By Judicial Choice, 64 CALIF. L. REV. 231, 251-56 (1976)
(contribution and comparative negligence). See also Comment, Reclassification of Tort
Recoveries by Spouses-Possible Effects of Graham v. Franco, 4 TEXAS TECH. L. REV.
359, 375-77 (1973) (contribution and imputed negligence in a community property con-
text); Comparative Negligence, supra note 6, at 777-78, 781-89, 804-05.
138. See notes 8-9 & accompanying text supra.
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does affect the total amount involved in any contribution dispute; i.e.,
recovery is larger under the broad interpretation, since it is not reduced
despite the noninjured spouse's concurrent negligence. However, Civil
Code section 5109 probably makes it impossible that any of the injured
spouse's recovery from the negligent spouse or his insurer is community
property.139 Damages for pain, suffering, and disfigurement are quite
certainly separate property, as they are under the Nevada rule, but
section 5109 probably also makes separate even those damages repre-
senting lost earnings during marriage, which ought to be classified as
community property under any possible theory absent section 5109. Yet
under McFadden, which presently governs the classification of recover-
ies from third-party defendants, all parts of the recovery-damages for
pain and suffering as well as damages for lost wages-are community
property.
Under a strict reading of section 875(a) of the Code of Civil
Procedure, it may be that the negligent spouse and the third-party
tortfeasor can claim contribution only in situations where the damages
which each has to pay are classified in the same way. That section
permits contribution against a cotortfeasor only when "a money judg-
ment has been rendered jointly against two or more defendants in a tort
action ....
Thus, the initial questions presented in considering the interrelation
of section 5112 and the law of contribution are the exact extent to which
section 5109 makes recovery separate property and the meaning of
"judgment . . . rendered jointly" against a spouse and a third-party
tortfeasor.
The question of interpreting section 5109 pits its literal language
and general common sense against legislative history. Literally, dam-
ages for "personal injuries" are those for disfigurement, pain, and
suffering. Damages for medical expenses and lost earnings stem from a
broader and more complex source. And if the spouses are still living
together as man and wife, by all logic the sums recovered for lost
earnings and medical expenses should be community property.'14  But
139. Section 5109 makes separate property of the plaintiff spouse "[a]ll money
or other property paid by or on behalf of a married person to his spouse in satisfaction
of a judgment for damages for personal injuries to the spouse. . . ." CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 5109 (West 1970).
140. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 875(a) (West Supp. 1977).
141. Fairness to creditors also suggests classifying the damages for lost earnings
as community. Otherwise, with the exception of necessaries, the creditor in a credit
purchase made by the nonvictim spouse may go unpaid, even though money awarded
in lieu of community lost earnings is on hand.
the Law Revision Commission, in recommending that section 5109 be
amended to its present form, stated:
Although personal injury damages awarded to a married person
against a third party should be community property, the Commis-
sion recommends retention of the rule that such damages are
separate property when they are recovered by one spouse from the
other spouse. If damages recovered by one spouse from the other
were regarded as community property, the tortfeasor spouse or his
insurer would, in effect, be compensating the wrongdoer to the ex-
tent of his interest in the community property. 142
This reasoning is unsound. Initially, when one spouse brings suit
against the other spouse, one of two situations almost certainly
exists: either their marriage has broken down and they have separated
so that section 5126 will make the appropriate portion of recovery
separate anyway, or the suit is brought in order to reach liability
insurance proceeds covering the negligent spouse's torts. 43 Particularly
where the insurance has been paid for with community funds, the
tortfeasor spouse is not "profiting" from his own wrong-rather, the
community is being assured the protection against loss which it has
purchased. It is difficult to see how merely making the community
whole for community sums used for medical expenses is unfairly com-
142. DAMAGES REPORT, supra note 55, at 1389, 1391. Neither section 5109 nor
any discussion of it in the Law Revision Commission report bars assertion of a claim
for reimbursement in a case of inequitable classification due to the all-separate recovery
rule of that section. Suppose, for example, that the wife's damages for lost earnings,
owed by her husband, are paid by insurance proceeds from a policy purchased and main-
tained with community property. Certainly the cost of the last premium can be asserted
in a reimbursement claim by the community against the wife's separate estate at dissolu-
tion of the marriage. Cf. Comment, Community and Separate Property Interests in Life
Insurance Proceeds: A Fresh Look, 51 WASH. L. REV. 351 (1976). However, in two
analogous recent cases where community funds have been used to qualify a husband
for workmen's compensation coverage, but an award had been declared to be separate
under Civil Code section 5126(a) and Marriage of Jones, 13 Cal. 3d 457, 531 P.2d
420, 119 Cal. Rptr. 108 (1975), reimbursement was disallowed. In re Marriage of
Robinson, 54 Cal. App. 3d 682, 126 Cal. Rptr. 779 (1976); In re Marriage of McDon-
ald, 52 Cal. App. 3d 509, 125 Cal. Rptr. 160 (1975). If these cases correctly indicate
that reimbursement is unavailable on the facts there, it may also be unavailable when
section 5109 converts into separate property what ought to be community and is paid
in part from community property. Probably Robinson and McDonald will be disap-
proved in the future insofar as they deny reimbursement. They are inconsistent with
the logic in In re Marriage of Cavner, 62 Cal. App. 3d 660, 133 Cal. Rptr. 267 (1976).
143. In the extremely unlikely event that one spouse sues the other while they
are married and living together for the purpose of levying on his property after obtain-
ing judgment, rather than reaching insurance proceeds, the tortfeasor spouse would still
be substantially "punished" for his negligence under a classification rule treating the
award for the injured spouse's lost earnings as community because of the operation of
Civil Code section 5113. This section provides that where one spouse injures another,
community property cannot be used to satisfy the judgment until the separate property
of the tortfeasor spouse is exhausted.
1398 THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 28
July 19773 CALIFORNIA COMMUNITY PROPERTY LAW
pensating the negligent spouse even when there was no insurance.
144
Much the same can be said of the recovery for lost earnings.
Nevertheless, the Law Revision Commission stated that the 1968
amendment to what is now section 5109 was to continue the all-separate
classification of the 1957 legislation in cases where one spouse recovered
damages from the other. Although I have found no actual holding that
the 1957 act made not just pain, suffering, and disfigurement damages
separate but also lost earnings, the Law Revision Commission assumed
this to be the case.1
45
Assuming, then, the courts give section 5109 the overbroad scope
intended for it by the Law Revision Commission, the combination of
that rule and the McFadden rule means that when one spouse, injured
by the concurrent negligence of the other and a third party, obtains a
judgment against both, his judgment against the negligent spouse is
separate property of the injured spouse, whereas the judgment against
the third party is community property. 40  If we add to this the broad
interpretation of section 5112, both the negligent spouse and the third
party probably will be declared jointly and severally liable, and thus
either of them seeking to claim contribution from the other can pass the
first hurdle of the contribution statute-that there be a "money judg-
ment . . . rendered jointly" against the two.'47 Presumably the fact
that sums paid by the defendant spouse will be separately owned while
sums paid by the third party will be community would not bar the entry
144. See Rogers v. Yellowstone Park Co., 97 Idaho 14, 539 P.2d 566 (1976); Mc-
Henry v. American Employers Ins. Co., 206 La. 70, 18 So. 2d 656 (1944). See also
Novo v. Hotel Del Rio, 141 Cal. App. 2d 304, 295 P.2d 576 (1956), allowing the
community in a suit brought by the wife to recover as damages community funds her
husband had paid to defendants on his gambling debts. The gambler husband had been
a wrongdoer both in incurring the debts and in paying them, but, the court held: "In
the instant case, the husband, although benefiting by the wife's recovery, would not
thereby be unjustly enriched. There would be but a return to the community of that
which was unlawfully taken from it . . . . [The judgment] merely places the parties
in the positions which they occupied prior to the transaction. No one is penalized
nor is anyone unduly enriched." Id. at 308, 295 P.2d at 579.
145. The 1957 act made separate property damages for lost earnings which would
have accrued during marriage while the spouses were living together. CAL. CIV. CoDE
§ 5109 (West 1970); DAMAGES REPORT, supra note 55 at 1389-90; cf. Estate of Rogers,
24 Cal. App. 3d 69, i0o Cal. Rptr. 735 (1972) (not attempting to segregate any dam-
ages received under the 1957 legislation as community property).
146. If the Nevada rule of classification were applied, the judgment against the
husband would be all separate property (under Section 5109) but that against the third-
party tortfeasor would be partly separate (to the extent that damages for pain, suffering,
and disfigurement were awarded) and partly community.
147. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 875 (West Supp. 1977). See note 9 & accompanying
text supra.
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of a joint judgment against the two defendants for the common amount
of damages for which each is liable.
On the other hand, using the narrow interpretation of section 5112,
the judgment will not declare the negligent spouse and the third party
jointly and severally liable for one sum of damages. Insofar as the
injured spouse's recovery is community property, the damages which the
third party is ordered to pay will be smaller than those for which the
negligent spouse will be adjudged liable. For example, if the negligent
spouse is 30 percent negligent, and the third party 70 percent negligent,
and if the non-negligent victim spouse suffers $100,000 worth of com-
munity damages, the judgment would make the third party liable to the
injured spouse for $70,000 and the negligent spouse for $100,000.118
If the injured spouse collects $70,000 from the third party, can he ob-
tain contribution from the negligent spouse? One would logically
assume that application of the comparative negligence system under the
narrow interpretation of section 5112 whereby the tortfeasor spouse's
30 percent negligence was considered at trial to reduce the liability of
the third party to the injured spouse should preclude any contribution.
But that is not the present California law, for Code of Civil Procedure
section 875(c) provides that the
right of contribution may be enforced only after one tortfeasor has,
by payment, discharged the joint judgment or has paid more than
his pro rata share thereof. It shall be limited to the excess so paid
over the pro rata share of the person so paying and in no event
shall any tortfeasor be compelled to make contribution beyond his
own pro rata share of the entire judgment. 149
Code of Civil Procedure section 876(a) provides that "[t]he pro rata
share of each tortfeasor shall be determined by dividing the entire judg-
ment equally among all of them." 15 ° This definition of "pro rata" pre-
cludes (notwithstanding section 875(b)'s direction to administer con-
tribution "in accordance with principles of equity") a holding that one
can obtain contribution only upon a showing that he has paid a greater
percentage of the joint judgment than his percentage of negligence.151
148. Applying the Nevada rule of classification and the narrow interpretation of
section 5112, assume that pain and suffering damages are $50,000 and lost earnings
damages $100,000, and that the spouses are living together. Three forms of judgment
are possible: (1) the husband owes $150,000 and the third party tortfeasor owes
$120,000; (2) the husband and the third party are jointly liable for $50,000, and in
addition the husband owes $100,000 and the third party $70,000; and (3) the husband
and the third party are jointly liable for $120,000 and in addition the husband owes
$30,000.
149. CAL. CODE CtV. PROC. § 875(c) (West Supp. 1976).
150. Id. § 876(a) (West Supp. 1977).
151. See note 8 & accompanying text supra.
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Accordingly, the third party, by having paid $70,000 is not unable
to seek contribution so long as a joint judgment exists. The third par-
ty's claim for contribution would seek a restructuring of the injured
spouse's judgment so as to treat it as providing, for purposes of the
third party's contribution claim, that the negligent spouse and the third
party are jointly liable to the injured spouse for $70,000, and the neg-
ligent spouse additionally owes the injured spouse $30,000. The tort-
feasor spouse's pro rata share of the $70,000 joint judgment is one half
(there being two joint tortfeasors as judgment debtors), so that the
negligent spouse owes the third party $35,000.152 If the injured spouse
proceeds against the negligent spouse or his insurer for the additional
$30,000 he owed, the negligent spouse or his insurer will be out of
pocket $65,000 and the third party will be out of pocket $35,000,
somewhat of a strange result on the facts.
If the broader interpretation of section 5112 is adopted, the tortfea-
sor spouse's negligence will not reduce the injured spouse's recovery
against a third party; a joint judgment of $100,000 will be rendered;
and if contribution claims are asserted, the negligent spouse and the
third party will ultimately pay $50,000 each, a bit more palatable result
given that the tortfeasor spouse was only 30 percent negligent.
The unfairness in the 65-35 allocation when section 5112 is given
the narrow interpretation results primarily from the senseless separate-
only classification mandated by section 5109 when one spouse seeks
recovery from another and by the pro rata sharing rule of Code of Civil
Procedure section 875(c), itself a strange approach in a system where
the jury can determine the relative fault of the defendant and the
plaintiff.
In the 1975-76 California legislature, a bill to alter the latter
approach to contribution law was submitted and passed the Senate
before dying in the Assembly by a re-referral to committee. This
proposal, Senate Bill 2119, would have amended Code of Civil Proce-
dure section 875(c) to provide:
Such right of contribution may be enforced only after one tortfeasor
has, by payment, discharged the joint judgment or has paid more
152. If the husband or his insurer pays the wife $100,000 on the judgment, then
the husband has discharged the third party's $70,000 obligation in full, for it is clear
that merely classifying the wife's rights against the third party as community, and her
rights against her husband as separate property, cannot permit her a double recovery.
Thus, again hypothetically restructuring the judgment to make $70,000 a joint liability
of the husband and the third party, the husband can recover the third party's pro rata
half share of the joint judgment. Once again the third party or his insurer is out of
pocket $35,000 and the husband or his insurer $65,000.
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than his proportionate share thereof, as determined by the trier of
fact in fixing the percentage of negligence attributable to him. It
shall be limited to the excess so paid over the proportionate share
of the person so paying and in no event shall any tortfeasor be com-
pelled to make contribution beyond his own proportionate share of
the entire judgment.' 53
If this were enacted, adoption of the narrow interpretation of section
5112 would result in less inequitable results. Thus, where, as in our
example, the spouse is 30 percent negligent, the third party is 70 percent
negligent, and the injured spouse's community damages (without con-
sidering the reclassification of them under section 5109) are $100,000,
the joint judgment against the tortfeasor spouse and the third party
would be $70,000, with the negligent spouse additionally liable for
$30,000. Contribution now would be figured by dividing the $70,000
damages awarded under the joint judgment to the plaintiff515 into 70
percent and 30 percent portions. The third party would pay $49,000;
the negligent spouse would pay $21,000 and an additional $30,000 if
the injured spouse proceeds against the negligent spouse for the "bonus"
provided by section 5109. But this 49 percent/51 percent ultimate
allocation of liability seems fairer than the 35 percent/65 percent result
obtained by applying the existing statutory law.'
The broad interpretation of section 5112, when coupled with S.B.
2119, leads to a result that is subject to no criticism insofar as contribu-
tion is concerned. The joint judgment is $100,000 (as the tortfeasor
spouse's negligence does not reduce even the community recovery), and
153. S.B. 2119 § 2 (1976). Section 3 of the bill would have amended section
876(a) of the Code of Civil Procedure to provide: "The proportionate share of each
tortfeasor judgment debtor shall be determined by multiplying the total damages awarded
to the plaintiff by the percentage of all tortfeasor judgment debtors' negligence attributa-
ble to the tortfeasor." Section I of the bill would have amended section 389 of the
Code of Civil Procedure to ordinarily require joinder of all persons who are alleged
by a party to have negligently contributed to a victim party's injuries. One remedy
for failure to join would have been dismissal, although the trial court could in the inter-
ests of justice permit the action to proceed.
It is unclear just what the author of the bill sought to achieve by the latter provi-
sion. Certainly it was anticipated that the trier of fact was to assess the percentage
of negligence of each joint tortfeasor in the action brought by the plaintiff so that
an additional trial on this issue would not be necessary in a contribution suit. Certainly,
too, it is preferable to compel joinder of all defendants so long as contribution cannot
be obtained against those whom, for reasons best known to him, the plaintiff elects
not to sue. See CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 875(a) (West Supp. 1977). But the repeal
of the joint judgment requirement is the preferable way to correct inequities in the
present law.
154. See note 153 & accompanying text supra.
155. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 875(c) (West Supp. 1977); CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 5109,
5112 (West 1970).
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the 70 percent negligent third party will, after contribution, pay out
$70,000 with the negligent spouse or his insurer paying $30,000. The
same goal-equating percentage of out-of-pocket expenses to percentage
of negligence-would be achieved by repealing 5109 (or interpreting it
restrictively, notwithstanding the intent of the Law Revision Commis-
sion) and applying the narrow interpretation of section 5112.
But whatever improvements in the functioning of contribution law,
either under the present statutes or a scheme like S.B. 2119, any
inconvenience that would flow from the broad interpretation of sec-
tion 5112 would seem slight compared to the unfairness to the third-
party tortfeasor under the broad interpretation of not reducing commu-
nity (marital partnership) damages due to concurrent negligence of one
partner. Any problems existing in the contribution area ought to be
addressed by legislative attention to Civil Code section 5109 and Code
of Civil Procedure sections 875 and 876, rather than by giving section
5112 an illogical interpretation with respect to "business" damages( i.e.,
lost earnings) enjoyed by married joint venturers.
The Extent to Which the Narrow Interpretation
Encourages Divorce or Separation
An interpretation of section 5112 which permits reduction of
community property damages (i.e, lost earnings and medical expenses
but not pain, suffering, and disfigurement damages if a proper classifi-
cation is made) based on the percentage of negligence of both spouses
does permit increasing the recovery by separation or divorce of the
spouse prior to rendering judgment against the third-party tortfeasor.
If a spouse (for example, the husband) is 30 percent negligent, the
third party 70 percent negligent, and the nonnegligent wife's damages
are $100,000 for pain and suffering, $100,000 in future lost earnings,
and $10,000 for future medical expenses, the separation of the husband
and wife, a divorce, or the husband's death prior to a judgment costs the
third-party $33,000. This result is obtained because Civil Code section
5126 acts to convert $110,000 of community recovery into the wife's
separate property, so that the theory that any partner's negligence
reduced partnership recovery is inapplicable and the husband's negli-
gence is irrelevant on the measure of damages issue.
Arguably, too, under the logic of Flores and Washington, which
reclassifies a cause of action on dissolution of the community, the
marriage of the tort victim after the accident but before rendition of
judgment against the third-party tortfeasor would result in a reduction
of damages if the new spouse were a cotortfeasor. Future lost earnings
and medical expenses would now be seen to be community property. This
argument should fail, however. As has been noted, the imputing to the
community the negligence of a marital partner cannot logically rest on
the notion that permitting recovery for lost earnings and medical expen-
ses causes any profit to the wrongdoer; the community is merely placed
in the position it would have been in absent the accident. Instead,
negligence is imputed on agency principles. In the case where the
victim marries after the accident, the new spouse was not at the time of
the injury a community agent and hence the subsequent forming of the
community may not make that negligence relevant to the measure of
damages issue.156
It must be conceded, however, that where the accident is followed
not by marriage but by separation or by dissolution of the community by
divorce or death of the nonvictim spouse, the narrow interpretation of
section 5112 has unfortunate consequences. The third-party tortfeasor
above will be outraged that postaccident events such as separation or
divorce can have such an effect. Therefore, it will be necessary to
permit him to litigate the bona fides of any such separation or even of a
divorce. 157 Unfortunately, if the post-accident separation is bona fide,
the narrow interpretation of section 5122 will at least theoretically
discourage reconciliation, since reconciliation would surely cause the
recoverable damages to revert back to their lower level existing before
the separation. 1 5 8
These problems are unfortunate, but do not, in my view, warrant
rejecting the logical interpretation of section 5112 and the treating of
husband and wife like other joint venturers when it comes to recoverable
damages under a comparative negligence system for monetary losses
156. The same theory will probably also apply when the accident occurs during
a separation of the spouses-creating a separate cause of action-and the spouses then
reunite before judgment is rendered. Probably the separated husband was not acting
as a community agent when his concurrent negligence and the wife's injury occurred.
However, it is possible for separated spouses to engage in community endeavors, for
although separation means future earnings and acquisitions are separate, former com-
munity property remains community until divorce. A tort occurring while the husband
was taking care of such community property would be one in which he was acting
as community agent even though separated at the time from his wife. Cf. Cross, The
Community Property Law of Washington, 49 WASH. L. REv. 729, 828-29 (1974).
157. For an example of a non-bona-fide divorce that should not be permitted to
increase the damages the third-party tortfeasor has to pay. See Omer v. Omer, 11 Wash.
App. 386, 523 P.2d 957 (1974). If the divorced spouses are living in a meretricious
relationship, this fact alone may preclude the increasing of recoverable damages.
158. If the spouses were divorced after the accident and remarried before rendition
of judgment, the new community might be treated as a revival of the old, thus theoreti-
cally "penalizing" the spouses for remarrying. CI. Draper v. United States, 243 F. Supp.
563, 565 n.1 (W.D. Wash. 1965).
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such as earnings. The California Supreme Court in the Washington
case must have realized that that decision made the bona fides of a
divorce a litigable issue if the third party tortfeasor contended it was
obtained to create a cause of action where none previously existed. The
court considered a proper application of tort and community property
law principles more important.
Moreover, even under the broad interpretation of section 5112, the
bona fides of the separation or divorce may be litigated. If a spouse is
injured, an ordinary creditor of the nonvictim negligent spouse will be
unable to reach sums awarded as the injured spouse's separate property
under Civil Code section 5126 due to postaccident separation or
divorce. Otherwise much of the award would have been community
property and liable for the torfeasor spouse's debts.' 59
Most important, common sense tells us that very few married
persons will separate or divorce for the greedy motive of increasing
damages from a third party tortfeasor. Surely, to the great majority,
marriage vows are more sacred than that. Thus, the cases in which the
narrow interpretation of section 5112 causes what may seem to some as
capricious results owing to separation or divorce following an accident
and leading to the litigation of the bona fides of such separation or
divorce, ought to be rare.
Conclusion
Under a comparative negligence system, no substantial basis exists
to stretch the literal language of Civil Code section 5112 to extend to
marital partners special protection not enjoyed by joint venturers general-
ly against the imputing of negligence to reduce damages that are
appropriately treated as owned by the partners. Damages properly
classified as community ought to be reduced under Li on account of the
concurrent causative negligence of either marital partner, just as dam-
ages recovered by a corporation will be reduced on account of the
negligence of any corporate agent acting for the entity.
However, section 5112 was probably intended primarily to correct
one of the unfortunate effects of California's all-community recovery
rule of classification. That is, negligence of one spouse should have no
bearing on the other's right to recover from a third-party tortfeasor
damages for pain, suffering, and disfigurement. Under a comparative
negligence system, concurrent negligence of the uninjured spouse should
not reduce such damages. A broad interpretation of section 5112 will
159. See CAL. CIv. CODE § 5116 (West Supp. 1977).
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
prevent this, but it will give the community in the same case a windfall,
since damages for lost earnings, community medical expenses, and the
like will not be reduced.
The solution to the problem caused by the all-community recovery
rule is to overrule McFadden and cases following it and to adopt instead
the Nevada rule for classifying tort damages as separate or community
according to the nature of the right invaded by the tortfeasor. 1 ° If this is
done, no significant public policy will be infringed by taking section
5112 at its word-that contributory negligence of the nonvictim spouse
is no "defense", but may instead be relevant to the measure of dam-
ages. 161
160. If the California Supreme Court does adopt the Nevada rule, it is suggested
that it recommend to trial courts in negligence cases in which a married person is the
plaintiff-even when the absence of any comparative negligence instructions concerning
plaintiff's spouse makes it not essential-that special verdicts be returned by the jury
designating how much of its award is for disfigurement, pain, and suffering, how much
for lost earnings or lost services, and how much for medical expenses. Cf. NEv. REv.
STAT. § 121.123 (1975). The procedure would alleviate the need for subsequent reliti-
gation of the damages issue in an attempt to second-guess the jury, such as where the
husband's creditor levies on the monies paid over and it is contended by the wife that
they are not liable for the husband's debt because they are her separate property under
the Nevada rule.
Where there are no special verdicts or findings of fact segregating the award, it
is suggested that the spouses themselves immediately upon receipt of the money enter
into a written agreement segregating it as best they can (with explanations for the rea-
sons therefore). Such agreement if reasonable and nonfraudulent ought to be binding
on creditors.
161. Four other community property states have adopted comparative negligence
systems. Three of them follow the Nevada rule of classification. Presumably in these
states, since their statutes contain nothing like section 5112 to suggest a prohibition,
damages for community lost earnings during marriage and medical expenses will be
reduced by the combined percentage of negligence of the spouses. See Knutsen, Cal-
ifornia Community Property Laws: A Plea for Legislative Study and Reform, 39 S.
CAL. L. REV. 240, 247 (1966); Note, Contributory Negligence of Husband as a Bar
to Recovery by Wife, 24 CALIF. L. REV. 739, 741 (1936) (nonvictim spouse's negligence
might logically mitigate damages); see Comment, Comparative Negligence: Tort Dam-
age Relief for the Marital Community, 9 IDAHO L. REV. 56, 60 (1972). The pertinent
comparative negligence statutes are IDAHO CODE §§ 6-801, 6-803 (Supp. 1976) (the latter
relating to contribution problems); NEv. REv. STAT. § 41.141 (1975); TEX. REV. Civ.
STAT. art. 2212(a) (Supp. 1977) (including treatment of contribution problems).
At the same time that Washington adopted comparative negligence by statute in
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.22.010 (Supp. 1976), its legislature provided that "[t]he
negligence of one marital spouse shall not be imputed to the other spouse to the mar-
riage so as to bar recovery in an action by the other spouse to the marriage, or his
or her legal representative, to recover damages from a third party caused by negligence
resulting in death or injury to the person." Id., § 4.22.020 (emphasis added). In view
of the fact that this statute was passed as part of a comparative negligence package,
the section makes little sense unless "bar" is intended to mean "reduce." See V.
SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE § 16.1, at 249 (1974).
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